



Institutional Biosafety Committee Meeting Minutes

The meeting was called to order on 8/25/2026 at 11:30AM. A quorum was present. The meeting was held via Zoom and in-person (Melville Library – 5th Floor, Room W5530). The meeting was open.

Attendance

Voting Members Present:

Rachel Brownlee
Nicholas Carpino
Jeronimo Cello
Jorge Escobar
Hwan Kim
Christopher Kuhlow
Alyssa Tuthill
Dafang Wang

Non-Voting Attendees, Staff and Guests Present:

Rebecca Dahl
Lu-Ann Kozlowski
Aimee Minton

Recording:

Erin Augello

Items

1. Meeting called to order at 11:30AM

2. Next meeting date and general announcements

The next meeting date is 9/22/2026. Dr. Kim surveyed the assembled group to assess any conflict of interest or quorum issues. Members should recuse themselves and leave the room or Zoom meeting during the review of a study on which they have a conflict of interest.

3. Review of minutes from last meeting

Review type: Full Committee Review

Action: Approved

Effective date: 11/25/2025

Vote: Total 7 For 8 Opposed 0; Abstained 0

4. Continuing reviews requiring IBC review

This section was reviewed and noted by the committee.

5. New studies for committee review

a. PROTO202600021 RESQ132EX-NMIBC

PI:	Michael Hung
Submission Type:	Initial Protocol
Safety Review Type:	Biosafety
Funding:	Stony Brook University, Grant Office ID: , Funding Source ID:
Training:	Staff require ELS 002, ELS 003, ENV 001, ENV 005.
Applicable Section of the NIH Guidelines that the Research Falls Under	III-D
Containment Conditions:	BSL-2

Determination: Modifications Required

Modifications (If Applicable):

i. Training is NOT up to date. Staff require ELS 002, ELS 003, ENV 001, ENV 005.

ii. BASIC INFORMATION

4. Please provide an additional description of the generation of recombinant Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (rBCG).

iii. PROTOCOL TEAM MEMBERS

1. Please clarify if Heather Cosgrove is involved in the proposed study. If so, please complete the form.

iv. FUNDING SOURCES

1. Please add funding sources.

v. BACTERIA, YEASTS, FUNGI OR PARASITES

1. BCG should be handled in BSL2.

vi. BIOHAZARDS

1. BCG should be handled in BSL2.

vii. RECOMBINANT AND SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACIDS USAGE

1. The NIH guidelines 3C for studies performing deliberate HGT into research participants of either:

1. recombinant nucleic acid molecules, or DNA, or RNA derived from synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or

2. synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or DNA, or RNA derived from synthetic nucleic acid molecules that meet any of the following criteria:

-contain more than 100 nucleotides

-possess biological properties that enable introduction of stable genetic modifications into the genome

- have potential to replicate in a cell
- can be translated or transcribed

Clarification is requested on whether the proposed studies fall under 3C and, if so, which of the referenced categories they fall under.

viii. RECOMBINANT AND SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACIDS WORK DESCRIPTION

1. Clarification is required to understand how the rBCG is generated. In addition, it is unclear whether rBCG is created by the PI or acquired.

ix. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

1. Please describe the potential consequences of aerosol exposure to BCG for laboratory personnel. Potential outcomes may include respiratory infection, localized pulmonary disease, and, in rare cases, disseminated infection, particularly in immunocompromised individuals.

4. BSC certification date must be revised.

x. DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN

5. Please provide a short description of why the proposed studies do not have DURC.

Effective Date: 6/30/2026

Project Expiration: 6/29/2027

Votes:

For:	8
Against:	0
Recused:	0
Absent:	2
Abstained:	0

b. SPROTO202600000004 Impact of immunity on spread and transmission of avian influenza viruses

PI:	Ketaki Wiser
Submission Type:	Initial Protocol
Safety Review Type:	Biosafety
Funding:	Name: Stony Brook University, Grant Office ID: 940071-08, Funding Source ID: • Name: Research Foundation for The State University of New York, Grant Office ID: 101654, Funding Source ID:
Training:	PI and all laboratory staff have been trained
Applicable Section of the NIH Guidelines that the Research Falls Under	III-D and III-F
Containment Conditions:	BSL-2

Determination: Modifications Required

Modifications (If Applicable):

i. BASIC INFORMATION

4. Please add additional detail describing the proposed rsNAM work.

ii. FUNDING SOURCES

1. Please include information related to funding.

iii. TISSUES, BLOOD OR BODILY FLUIDS

1. Please define and clarify "Non Human Derived Blood and Blood Types". BSL-2+ is not a standard designation of biocontainment level. Please clarify what additional measures are taken above regular BSL-2 practice (also documented in other sections).

iv. BIOHAZARDS

1. Please include DF-1 cells (indicated in Primary cells #3) in this section.

2. Please provide descriptions for the uses of agents listed in #1.

v. RECOMBINANT AND SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACIDS WORK DESCRIPTION

4. Please include BSL3 CMM.

vi. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

1. Please include information related to the potential for bloodborne pathogens with use of human derived materials.

4. BSC use will be applicable. Please include certification information.

vii. WASTE MANAGEMENT

4. Please include a brief description of information related to the steps that would be taken in the event of a biological accident (do not just reference EH&S protocols or policies).

Effective Date: 9/3/2026

Project Expiration: 9/2/2027

Votes:

For:	8
Against:	0
Recused:	0
Absent:	2
Abstained:	0

c. SPROTO202600000005 Cancer and Intestinal Fibrosis Biosafety Protocol

PI:	Minguk Jo
Submission Type:	Initial Protocol
Safety Review Type:	Biosafety
Funding:	• Name: National Institutes of Health, Grant Office ID: FP00016338, Funding Source ID: 1K22CA303691-01 • Name: Crohns and Colitis Foundation, Grant Office ID: FP00016415, Funding Source ID: 1287804
Training:	PI and all laboratory staff have been trained
Applicable Section of the NIH Guidelines that the Research Falls Under	III-D, III-E, III-F
Containment Conditions:	BSL-2

Determination: Modifications Required

Modifications (If Applicable):

i. GENE TRANSFER: VIRUS

2. Please change to "Yes".

ii. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

1. PI should expand the consequences of potential RCL exposure to describe the possible clinical manifestations of an acute and/or persistent systemic lentiviral infection.
4. Please update the BSC certification date.

Votes:

For:	8
Against:	0
Recused:	0
Absent:	2
Abstained:	0

d. SPROTO202600000010 Virus Directed Neuronal Responses

PI:	Erich Mackow
Submission Type:	Initial Protocol
Safety Review Type:	Biosafety
Funding:	None
Training:	PI and all laboratory staff have been trained
Applicable Section of the NIH Guidelines that the Research Falls Under	III-E
Containment Conditions:	BSL-2

Determination: Modifications Required**Modifications (If Applicable):**

i. In Section: Basic Information

Item 4. PI should identify in the research summary the specific viruses proposed for use rather than referring to them generally as “BSL-2 viruses,” since BSL-2 refers to a containment level rather than an agent classification.

ii. In Section: Funding Sources

Item 1. Please include funding information.

iii. In Section: Viruses or Prions & Biohazards

The proposed containment levels listed in Viruses or Prions and Biohazards sections, require revision. According to the BMBL, Heartland virus should be handled at BSL-3 rather than BSL-2 as currently indicated. The other arboviruses listed may generally be handled at BSL-2, including the attenuated CHIKV 181/25 strain. However, the PI should provide sufficient information regarding virus propagation, volumes and concentrations, and potential aerosol-generating procedures to allow the IBC to perform a risk assessment and determine whether the proposed BSL-2 containment is appropriate or whether BSL-3 containment is warranted for any of these activities. This protocol-specific risk assessment, considering agent characteristics and the nature and scale of the procedures performed, is recommended by the BMBL when determining the appropriate containment level.

iv. In Section: Risk Group and Containment Practices

1. The highest risk group (RG) for some of the viruses listed is RG3 or RG4, not RG2. Please revise.

v. In Section: Exposure Assessment and Protective Equipment

Item 1. Here, the response requires revision. The statement that these arboviruses predominantly cause mild or asymptomatic infections, with arthralgia or neurologic sequelae mainly in immunocompromised individuals, is not accurate. Symptomatic disease can occur in

immunocompetent individuals. For example, CHIKV commonly causes acute febrile illness with prominent arthralgia/polyarthralgia, which may be prolonged; La Crosse virus can cause neuroinvasive disease and encephalitis, particularly in children; and Heartland and Bourbon viruses can cause systemic febrile illness with fatigue, headache, myalgia, gastrointestinal symptoms, and potentially severe disease. The PI may group viruses with similar manifestations rather than describing each virus separately, but the major potential consequences of infection should be adequately represented.

In addition, natural transmission by ticks or mosquitoes does not fully describe the potential routes of laboratory exposure. Work with concentrated virus preparations may result in exposure through aerosols, splashes to mucous membranes, percutaneous inoculation, or contact with compromised skin, depending on the procedures performed. These potential laboratory exposure routes should be acknowledged.

The description of measles virus exposure is also incomplete. It should describe the typical acute disease and potential complications rather than focusing only on rare neurologic disease.

Finally, because human cell lines are used in this protocol, the response should acknowledge the potential risk of exposure to bloodborne pathogens associated with these materials, as specifically requested in this section.

Item 2. PPE for working in BSL3 should include booties, double gloves, PAPR or N95, and coveralls.

Effective Date: 9/3/2026

Project Expiration: 9/2/2027

Votes:

For:	7
Against:	0
Recused:	1
Absent:	2
Abstained:	0

e. SPROTO202600000011 WNV and JEV Neuron Infection

PI:	Erich Mackow
Submission Type:	Initial Protocol
Safety Review Type:	Biosafety
Funding:	None
Training:	PI and all laboratory staff have been trained
Applicable Section of the NIH Guidelines that the Research Falls Under	III-E
Containment Conditions:	BSL-3

Determination: Modifications Required

Modifications (If Applicable):

i. In Section: Basic Information

Item 4. The summary should be revised to avoid referring to WNV and JEV as “BSL-3 viruses,” since BSL-3 refers to the containment level. There is no such thing as a “BSL-3 pathogen”.

ii. In Section: Funding Sources

Item 1. Please include funding information.

iii. In Section: Biohazards

Biohazards list should also include other mammalian species cell lines that were indicated in #2 of the Primary Cells and Cell Lines section.

iv. In Section: Exposure Assessment and Protective Equipment

Item 1. The description focuses primarily on the natural mosquito-borne transmission and clinical manifestations of JEV and WNV and does not adequately address potential laboratory exposure. When high-titer or concentrated virus preparations are handled, potential laboratory exposure routes include percutaneous inoculation, mucous membrane exposure, and inhalation of infectious aerosols. Laboratory-acquired WNV infections following aerosol exposure have been documented, and these potential non-natural routes of exposure should be addressed for both viruses as part of the laboratory risk assessment.

In addition, the statement that JEV and WNV present a “blood-borne pathogen exposure” risk does not address the question regarding the human cell lines used in this protocol. Please separately acknowledge the potential exposure to bloodborne pathogens or other adventitious infectious agents associated with human-derived cells and describe the potential consequences of such exposure.

Effective Date: 9/3/2026

Project Expiration: 9/2/2027

Votes:

For:	7
Against:	0
Recused:	1
Absent:	2
Abstained:	0

6. Review of incidents

None

7. Review of other agenda items

None

8. Inspection results

All inspections and responses were summarized by Mr. Kuhlow and reviewed and noted by the committee.

9. Discussion items/readings (major and minor points of order)

None

10. Meeting adjourned at 12:16PM