Memory Unbound
The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory

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Abstract
This article analyzes the distinctive forms that collective memories take in the age of globalization. It studies the transition from national to cosmopolitan memory cultures. Cosmopolitanism refers to a process of ‘internal globalization’ through which global concerns become part of local experiences of an increasing number of people. Global media representations, among others, create new cosmopolitan memories, providing new epistemological vantage points and emerging moral-political interdependencies. The article traces the historical roots of this transformation and outlines the theoretical foundations for the emergence of cosmopolitan memories through an examination of how the Holocaust has been remembered in Germany, Israel and the USA in the course of the last fifty years. It is precisely the abstract nature of ‘good and evil’ that symbolizes the Holocaust, which contributes to the extra-territorial quality of cosmopolitan memory. As such, memories of the Holocaust contribute to the creation of a common European cultural memory.

Key words
collective memory • cosmopolitan memory • European memory • globalization • Holocaust

Introduction
The objective of this article is to analyze the distinctive forms that collective memories take in the age of globalization. Our central thesis: alongside nationally bounded memories a new form of memory emerges which we call
‘cosmopolitan memory’. The study of collective memory usually considers these memory structures as being bound by tight social and political groups like the ‘nation’ or ‘ethnos’ (Halbwachs, 1980; Smith, 1995). What happens when an increasing number of people in Western mass-consumer societies no longer define themselves (exclusively) through the nation or their ethnic belonging? Can we imagine collective memories that transcend national and ethnic boundaries? If so, how do these transnational memory forms come about and what do they consist of?

We suggest that shared memories of the Holocaust, the term used to describe the destruction of European Jewry by Nazi Germany between 1941 and 1945, a formative event of the twentieth century, provide the foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory, a memory transcending ethnic and national boundaries. Can an event, by many defined as a watershed in European history (Bartov, 1996; Diner, 2000) be remembered outside the ethnic and national boundaries of the Jewish victims and the German perpetrators? Can this event be memorialized by people who do not have a direct connection to it? At the beginning of the third millennium, memories of the Holocaust facilitate the formation of transnational memory cultures, which in turn, have the potential to become the cultural foundation for global human rights politics. This nation-transcending dynamic stands at the center of our sociological analysis. We are not studying the historical event called the Holocaust, but rather how changing representations of this event have become a central political-cultural symbol facilitating the emergence of cosmopolitan memories. The choice of the Holocaust is not arbitrary. The Holocaust, or rather the representations that produce shared memories, is a paradigmatic case for the relation of memory and modernity. Modernity, until recently one of the primary analytic and normative frameworks for intellectual self-understanding, is itself questioned through memories of the Holocaust. On this view, the mass murder of European Jews by the Nazis is not considered as a German-Jewish tragedy but as a tragedy of reason or of modernity itself (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1999; Arendt, 1963; Bauman, 1989). We will try to go beyond the critique of modernity and argue, that in an age of ideological uncertainty these memories have become a measure for humanist and universalist identifications. This article traces the theoretical foundations for the emergence of ‘cosmopolitan memories’ through an examination of how the Holocaust has been remembered in Germany, Israel and the USA in the course of the last fifty years. The conventional concept of ‘collective memory’ is firmly embedded within the ‘Container of the Nation-State’. We argue that this container is in the process of being slowly cracked. It is commonly assumed that memory, community and geographical proximity belong together. We direct our attention to global processes that are characterized by the deterritorialization of politics and culture (Tomlinson, 1999). We observe an increasing process of ‘internal globalization’ in recent years (Beck, 2001), which implies that issues of global concern are able to become part and parcel of everyday local experiences and moral life worlds of an increasing number of people. Does this open up new ‘memorystapes’? Can solidarities and mutual responsibilities transcend territorial boundaries?
Our central objective is to trace the increasing loss of identification of collective memory and national history. National and ethnic memories are transformed in the age of globalization rather than erased. They continue to exist, of course, but globalization processes also imply that different national memories are subjected to a common patterning. They begin to develop in accord with common rhythms and periodizations. But in each case, the common elements combine with pre-existing elements to form something new. In each case, the new, global narrative has to be reconciled with the old, national narratives; and the result is always distinctive.

**Globalization and Collective Memory: Representations**

Critics of globalization consider it as something that dissolves collective memory and sets up inauthentic and rootless substitutes in its stead. Anthony Smith puts it as follows: ‘a timeless global culture answers to no living needs and conjures no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity in the making’ (Smith, 1995: 24). Why can it conjure no memories? Because timelessness is of its essence: ‘This artificial and standardized universal culture has no historical background, no developmental rhythm, no sense of time and sequence. . . alien to all ideas of “roots,” the genuine global culture is fluid, ubiquitous, formless and historically shallow’ (p. 22). Smith’s statement is emblematic of two recurring assertions which: one, restrict memory to the symbolic boundaries of the nation; and two, situate it in a normative dichotomy of real lived experiences and inauthentic mediated representations.

To say that nations are the only possible containers of true history is a breathtakingly unhistorical assertion. Religious traditions and institutions like the Catholic Church and Judaism are good examples. In addition, there is now a vast literature on national tradition, and it is clear that every single national tradition has gone through a moment of ‘invention’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). What makes the irony especially rich is that when national cultures were being invented, they were opposed with exactly the same arguments that are being aimed at global culture today: 1 that they were superficial and inauthentic substitutes for rich local culture, and that no one would ever identify with such large and impersonal representations. Notwithstanding the fact that this turned out to be spectacularly wrong, the perception that representations are substitutes for ‘authentic’ experiences persists.

Pierre Nora (1996) is a prime exponent of this point of view. His book *Les lieux de mémoire* (Realm of Memory) is a touchstone in the literature. Nora distinguishes between the social environments, or milieux, of memory, and the sites that have been set up to preserve the memory of events. He sees the latter as a substitute for living traditions. ‘Memorial sites exist because the social environment of memory exists no longer, the surroundings in which memory is an essential component of everyday experience’ (1996: 1). This distinction between the authentic memories and substitutes for them is a necessary precondition to a view
like Anthony Smith's that global culture is producing an 'eternal present' (1995: 21). To be sure, face-to-face interaction is different from mediated interaction. The story of the Holocaust told by survivors to their children is different from what you learn from the movies or in school. But there is a fallacy in thinking that impersonal representations are somehow fake and not connected to our real emotions and real identities. Once again, the history of the nation-state is instructive. Nora's view essentially restates the late nineteenth-century opposition between Geshellschaft and Gemeinschaft, which opposed the new, nation-wide political and economic structures to those of local communities. It claimed that larger structures were soulless. And part of this soullessness lay in their impersonal means of communications, like the newspapers. But the argument turned out to be a romantic and nostalgic one. Mechanical representations did not stand in the way of strong identification. They fostered it.

Our critique of Nora is directed against his implicit normative claim and the fixation on the nation-state as the sole possible (and imaginable) source for the articulation of authentic collective memories. Hence he laments that 'the acceleration of history, then, confronts us with the brutal realization of the difference between real memory and history, which is how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organize the past' (Nora, 1989: 8). Along with this transformation, Nora also recognizes that the transmission of memory has expanded to social forces outside the realm of the state. 'The coupling of state and nation was gradually replaced by the coupling of state and society' (p. 11). No longer is the nation-state the uncontested privileged site for the articulation of collective identity. Nora points to and deplores the erosion of the state's ability to impose a unitary and unifying framework of memory. He constructs an opposition that is reminiscent of the 'fin de siecle syndrome', based on the abstract assumption that modernity destroyed tradition with its micro-sociological equivalent focusing on alienation and anomie among individuals without social bonds. And this is also the kind of criticism that informs Bauman's (1989) reading of the 'modernity' of the Holocaust. The same objections that were raised against the modern nation-state at the end of the nineteenth century, now serve as the last resort in its defense. However, in both transitions, to the national and to the global, representations play a central role. In his classic book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1983) described how all communities, and especially nations, are unities that are fundamentally imagined. The very belief that there is something fundamental at the bottom of them is the result of a conscious myth-building process. The nation-state, at the turn of the twentieth century, depended for its coming into existence on a process by which existing societies used representations to turn themselves into new wholes that would act immediately upon people's feelings, and upon which they could base their identities – in short, to make them into groups that individuals could identify with. This nation building process parallels what is happening through globalization at the turn of the twenty-first century. The nation was the global when compared to the local communities that preceded it; however, this did not render it inauthentic. The ability of representations to give a sense to life is not ontologically
but rather sociologically determined. So if the nation is the basis for authentic feelings and collective memory – as the critics of global culture seem almost unanimous in maintaining – then it cannot be maintained that representations are a superficial substitute for authentic experience. The nation was literally inconceivable without an imagined community. On the contrary, representations are the basis of that authenticity. And there is nothing inconceivable, theoretically and empirically, about them providing such a basis on a global level.

Rather than privileging one form of memory over the other, it seems more fruitful to identify the different historical and sociological conditions of memory cultures. Jan Assmann's distinction between two memory types is instructive. He differentiates between communicative memory, based on group-specific carriers, on the one hand, and cultural memories that can exist independent of its carriers. What is at stake, is the transformation of communicative, i.e. lived and in witnesses embodied memory, into cultural, i.e. institutionally shaped and sustained memory, that is, into “cultural mnemotechnique” (Assmann, 1991: 343). This nexus of time changes and the need for representational mechanisms is also acknowledged in the work of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, a foundational figure in the field of collective memory studies. Halbwachs (1980) makes a distinction between social memory and historical memory. Social memory is the memory of things that one has experienced personally and that the group which one is a part of has experienced. It is history before it becomes history: the present experienced through a group and then remembered. To take the Holocaust as an example, the social memory of it is limited to the generation that lived through the war. Historical memory, on the other hand, is memory that has been mediated, by films and books and schools and holidays. For most people in most countries, national experience is overwhelmingly based on such represented memories. In the case of the Holocaust, only a small minority who experienced Nazism first hand is alive. For all the rest of us, it is an experience mediated by representations.

Anderson describes how the nation was made into a ‘horizontal society’ and how various symbols through which this society was re-presented to itself played a key role. He makes it clear that it was precisely the now-lambasted media that produced the requisite solidarity through a constant repetition of images and words. Technological changes in the means of communication are of central importance for the structuration of memory, time and culture. In the era of the nation-state the central institution was the press. The electronic media plays an analogous role in the era of globalization (Thompson, 1995). Immediate speed and imagery of the new global communications facilitate a shared consciousness and cosmopolitan memories that span territorial and linguistic borders. A moral proposal is made to the viewer, a proposal which can either be accepted or rejected but hardly ignored. In global times, the media also becomes a mediator of moral affairs (for a discussion of the moral consequentiality of the media, see Tester, 1999). A distinctive element of the new media is the rise of ‘media events’. Through media events a live and concentrated local action can be shared by the world (Dayan and Katz, 1992). This is how the world is transported into the
local. Distant others can be part of the strong feelings of everyday life. But we have to emphasize here the overriding importance of the local context. People do not simply identify with what they see on television. Strong identifications are only produced when distant events have a local resonance. But paradoxically, this ethnocentric focus on events is precisely the process that causes a belief in, and then willingness to act on, universal values. The basis of a wider shared morality is identification with distant others. However, this is produced through a connection of the global with the local. The new identity is produced not instead of the old but through transforming it – just as in the building of nations.

Holocaust Representations in Germany, Israel and the USA

Is it possible to establish this transformation empirically? We examine three countries where the Holocaust has played a foundational role for their respective self-images: Germany, Israel and the USA. We will show how collective memories in those places have undergone significant changes, warranting an analysis transcending the nation-state. In the political cultures of Germany, Israel and the USA, memories of the Holocaust are a prominent theme (Segev, 1993; Novick, 1999; Olick and Levy, 1997). They are expressed in a reciprocal relation of particular and universal forms of memory (Levy, 1999). In the past memories of the Holocaust were organized around a dichotomy of universalism and particularism (Young, 1993). Instead of reducing these terms to their ideological assumptions, we treat them as an important object in our investigation. We historicize notions of particularism and universalism, thereby de-moralizing them while retaining them as valuable sociological tools. Our primary objective is to disentangle these terms from their conventional ‘either-or’ perspective and understand them in terms of ‘as well as’ options. Cultural and religious particularism can be justified with universal claims of difference or ‘contextual universalism’ (Beck, 2000) that increasingly accepts transnational connections (such as ‘dual citizenship’ or ‘bi-lingualism’). Consequently speaking about the cosmopolitization of Holocaust memory does not imply some progressive universalism subject to a unified interpretation. The Holocaust does not become one totalizing signifier containing the same meanings for everyone. Rather its meanings evolve from the encounter of global interpretations and local sensibilities. The cosmopolitization of Holocaust memories thus involves the formation of nation-specific and nation-transcending commonalities. These cosmopolitization memories refer to concrete social spaces that are characterized by a high degree of reflexivity and the ongoing encounter with different cultures. On this view, it is no longer the dichotomy but the mutual constitution of particular and universal conceptions that determine the ways in which the Holocaust can be remembered. The cosmopolitization of memory does not mean the end of national perspectives so much as their transformation into more complex entities where different social groups have different relations to globalization. One of the central questions relates to the ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ form to commemorate the
Who does the Holocaust 'belong' to in the global age? Can it only belong to the Jewish victims of the German perpetrators? How, for example, do Turkish-Germans remember the Holocaust? Or does the Holocaust belong to all who want to define themselves as victims?

Both the historiography and the commemoration of the Holocaust have exploded in the last two decades. But this is not merely a function of the enormity of the event. We would like to argue instead that what has pushed the Holocaust to such prominence in public thinking relates to the need for a moral touchstone in an age of uncertainty and the absence of master ideological narratives. It has become a moral certainty that now stretches across national borders and unites Europe and other parts of the world. At the same time, we have to emphasize that the central meaning of the Holocaust has been different in every country. The Holocaust, even the term, is surrounded by different taboos in each country. The fact that the word has become sacred in this way is a sign that it has a central place in each country's set of central beliefs. And yet, it is no accident that the same word is used in all of them. These different national meanings co-evolved. With the growth of cosmopolitanism, with the circulation of activists and scholars and media images, there has been a growing cross-fertilization.

The Holocaust has been confronted by various forces, which have attempted to universalize it, to particularize it, and to nationalize it. But recently this memory has continued to exist on a global level. Its strength as a global collective memory has been powered and maintained precisely through the fiery interaction between the local and the global. We argue that this dual process of particularization and universalization has produced a symbol of transnational solidarity that is based on a cosmopolitanized memory – one that does not replace national collective memories but exists as their horizon. Our analysis of this transformation identifies three crucial time periods during which representations of the Holocaust were recast. We start with the immediate postwar period, followed by the formation of Holocaust awareness since the 1960s and the subsequent commemorative trend during the 1980s, and conclude our analysis with a look at the 1990s during which we observe the normative and institutional formation of cosmopolitan memories. This periodization reflects the respective developments in the three countries under investigation. However, it also transcends national boundaries and recognizes epochal commonalities, which allow people to identify with cultural representations that originate elsewhere.

The Postwar Years

The immediate aftermath of the Second World War was marked by a silence concerning the destruction of European Jewry, which at that time did not even have a name yet. It was broadly subsumed under the atrocities of the war. The idea of the Holocaust did not spring full-grown from the facts. And yet, surprisingly perhaps, all the 'facts' were there in the beginning. The Nuremberg trials were held in November 1945, where the highest Nazi officials still alive and under guard were accused of killing 5.7 million Jews as part of a conscious plan.
up the original document on the internet reveals a 226-screen-long document. But only three are taken up with the extermination of the Jews. And that is a fairly graphic representation of how the Holocaust was originally conceived: as one in an almost endless list of Nazi crimes. It was perceived as part of a larger practice of war crimes. To be sure, Auschwitz was certainly addressed by intellectuals and others, but the Holocaust did not permeate public discourse nor was its commemoration institutionalized. Germany, Israel and the USA had different motivations for being silent about this past, but there were also nation-transcending commonalities that informed the postwar references to the Holocaust.

Germany’s intentions in silencing memories of the Holocaust are widely documented (Bartov, 1996; Diner, 2000). The Federal Republic originally saw its foundation as a complete break with the past, captured in the infamous slogan of the ‘Zero Hour’. It accepted the legal formula of being the ‘successor state’ to Nazi Germany mostly in response to its actual division. An acknowledgment of political responsibility for the ‘crimes committed by a small murderous gang of Nazis in the name of Germany’ was not only marked by this kind of linguistic distancing but also confined to a few voices. References to the Holocaust were frequently articulated in the broader context of war atrocities and as a measure of German suffering. Talk about a ‘European Civil War’ – a term that later would become a code word for historical revisionism in Germany – was a pervasive rhetorical strategy among leading politicians and other public figures. Self-victimization played a crucial role in this respect: Germans as the victims of Nazi propaganda, Soviet brutality, Allied occupation. All this shifted attention away from the victims of the Germans and instead commemorated the victimhood of the Germans. De-Nazification and deliberate attempts to confront the past remained the exception and futile (Frei, 1997). The Nuremberg trials, by putting a small group of responsible figures on the stand, were widely seen as drawing a line under the past. The Cold War, together with a focus on the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) provided Germany with a universal frame of reference. Modernization, both in economic and cultural terms and as a paradigm for sociological analysis, dominated the public imagination.4

This forward-looking memory was not confined to the nation of perpetrators. The nascent Israel, with almost half of its population consisting of Holocaust survivors, also minimized memories of Jewish victimhood. Even in Israel, conscious collective memory was impossible until there was a suitable framework. The Holocaust was not officially commemorated until fourteen years after the war (Segev, 1993). Both the original suppression and the current sacred remembrance were equally the expression of Israel’s constitution, its self-understanding, and its place in the world. Israel’s commemorative approach to the Holocaust was marked by ambivalence from its very beginning. Zionism, as a movement of national independence, was based on the assumption that Jewish assimilation in Europe had failed. This negative view of Jewish life in exile stands at the core of Israel’s initial reluctance and the subsequent formula of commemorating the Holocaust. Memories of the Holocaust fulfilled two mutually exclusive functions: on the one, they represent the victims as typical examples of Jewish passivity as
a consequence of the lack of sovereignty; on the other, they commemorated those Zionist martyrs who actively resisted the Nazis. Israel’s sovereign politics were associated with active decisions, while the Holocaust was a reminder of helpless passivity typical of Jewish existence outside the sovereign space of the territorial state.

The USA was neither perpetrator nor victim. It embodied the role of ‘savior’ and ‘witness’. During that period, American memories of the Nazi crimes consisted of a universalistic perspective emphasizing atrocities in general. On this view, there was no room for the ethnic fate of the Jews, but instead the diversity of victims was emphasized. Jewish survivors arriving in the USA did not stress their particular status of survivors but generally tried to ‘integrate’ into American society (Novick, 1999). Like Germany and Israel, surging consumption and a strong optimism about the future dominated postwar society in the USA. In this atmosphere there was little room to dwell on the past. Another political factor that contributed to the bracketing of the Holocaust was the rhetoric of the Cold War (during which the old enemy Germany had become an ally, and the Soviet Union, the old ally, had become the new enemy) and its conceptual foundation, the theory of totalitarianism. In this context there was no space for a particularistic version of the Holocaust. Instead the victims of concentration camps were primarily depicted as political prisoners (Novick, 1999). The lessons of the Second World War were focused on Hiroshima. According to Peter Novick the Holocaust represented a period that had been overcome, whereas Hiroshima symbolized the destructive potential of nuclear weapons in the present. In light of the danger of a nuclear war in the future, Hiroshima was much more decisive for the memories of the Second World War. This future-oriented memory was also evident in the treatment of victims. Contrary to the esteemed status that victims enjoy in today’s world, their story in the postwar period was addressed only insofar as it served as testimony to the inability to leave the past behind them and become fully integrated members of society in the future. However, this future-oriented universalism was not yet part of the current cosmopolitan repertoire. The Holocaust was not perceived as a timeless and de-territorialized measuring stick for good and evil, but instead as a terrible aspect of a particular era.

The Iconographic Formation of the Holocaust

During the second period, between the 1960s and 1980s, the foundations for the iconographic status of the Holocaust were established. This period constitutes a turning point for the reception and institutionalization of Holocaust memory. Against the background of a series of important trials of former Nazis, like the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961 and the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt in 1963, detailed accounts and widespread media representations of the Holocaust reached a broad audience. For the first postwar generation it was a formative event in their political socialization. However, the growing attention to its Jewish victims stems from different nation-specific conditions. In Germany the
Holocaust served the New Left to establish a self-critical historical narrative and an increasing loss in the ‘holiness’ of the nation. Underlying it was the very personal confrontation this new generation had with their parents, or rather with the refusal of their parents to address their own Nazi past. Memories of the Holocaust were less about Jewish victims than about the lessons the Federal Republic should draw from this past. The official and symbolic repertoire of national self-understanding in Germany has since been dominated by the commemorative expressions of the Holocaust.

On the background of the Eichmann trial and the six-day war in 1967, the Holocaust assumed a new and prominent role in Israel’s political culture. It became a symbol for existential fears and the necessity to construct and maintain a strong military state. It was transformed into one more example of the archetypical Jewish story, one more instance where the enemies of the Jewish people tried to exterminate them and did not quite succeed. As such, it was mapped onto the Arab/Israeli conflict and has remained there ever since. In the USA, the growing prominence of the Holocaust among Jews coincided with the emergence of ethnic identity politics.

Three central changes characterize this period: (1) a generational transition from social to historical memories. The war generation, whose experience was based on autobiographic memories, was gradually replaced by postwar generations whose understanding of the Holocaust was based on symbolic representations; and (2) a growing historicization of the event. The resulting historiographical reflexivity greatly contributed to its iconographic status. And (3) with the broadcast of the TV series Holocaust at the end of the 1970s, a major turning point in the media representation and the ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust was accomplished. Characteristic of these changes was the temporal duality of memory: the memories of the Holocaust came to be regarded as unique with reference to the past and universal for the future. That is to say, the Holocaust past is something that happened predominantly to the Jews, while the Holocaust future might happen to anyone.

The Post-Cold War Period

The Cold War was an alliance of values as much as of interests. Similarly, the decision of each country to enter into this alliance was a mixture of value and interest, a combination that is at the bottom of national loyalty. People feel triumphant or ashamed of their country, as if it were a projection of their ‘self’. The end of the Cold War was, therefore, a decisive turning point for the possibility of the normative formation and institutionalization of cosmopolitanized memories. When the uniting interests and values of anti-communism vanished, international cooperation had to be reorganized on a new basis. The attempt to
articulate and organize around new values has been a conscious one over the last ten years. And it is no accident that the Holocaust has come to play a major role in that reorganization. It has emerged precisely because of its status as an unquestioned moral value on which all people can supposedly agree. With the end of a bifurcated world, the USA was less inclined to support client states that blatantly violated human rights. This had an immediate effect on the discourse of the Holocaust, as the needs of the state and the discourse of human rights no longer stood in opposition to each other. The post-Cold War era and the aftermath of reunification also compelled Germany to find a new political and cultural place in Europe. It did so by pursuing a dual strategy centering the Holocaust as an integral part of national history (see for instance the decade-long debate regarding the memorial in Berlin), and simultaneously decentering it by turning the Holocaust into a European event (e.g. see the arguments for German participation in Kosovo and the Stockholm Forum). The mnemonic significance of the Holocaust is further complicated through generational transformations and the gradual recognition that Germany is a country of immigration. Even within the small Jewish community in Germany, large numbers of immigrants from the former Soviet Union (essentially saving these communities from extinction) are bringing their own memories with them. For them, the Holocaust, as a particular Jewish event, was overshadowed by memories of the war the Soviet Union waged against fascism. For Israel, the end of the Cold War meant the beginning of an evocative peace process, which allowed for a marginal but influential part of Israeli society to extend the scepter of compassion to identify with victims in general, and Palestinian victims in particular. These voices have relativized Jewish victimhood and have even accused the establishment of ‘instrumentalizing’ the Holocaust for political purposes (Segev, 1993).

In sum, new narrative frameworks and their mediation through political and cultural institutions, reconfigured the Holocaust as a decontextualized event and contributed to its focal position in the European memoryscape. More specifically, the dissemination of the Holocaust as a global icon was facilitated through a number of mass mediated events and their explicit connection to the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans. Most prominently were Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List and the inauguration of the Holocaust Museum in Washington.

‘Kosovocaust’

The warfare of the 1990s in Bosnia and Kosovo, or rather the public discourse surrounding it, is an excellent illustration of these processes. The trope that equates Serbs with Nazis did not spring immediately from the facts. There was unfortunately nothing unusual about the scale of atrocities in Bosnia. Worse went on in many parts of the world during the same period. And the original understanding of the situation was not that one side was oppressing another, but that it sprung from the ‘irrational’ and ‘ancient hatreds’ that characterized the Balkans. The lesson of history at the beginning of the 1990s was that the problems were insoluble and intervention was doomed. Slowly over the course of the
Bosnian conflict the US public came to identify the Serbs with the Nazis. An award winning news photo of an extremely thin old man seen through a fence was a crucial trigger for this emerging view (Gutman, 1993). In conjunction with Serb ‘camps’, this seemed to have been a turning point. But it did not happen at once. If the power of this idea in America can be measured by the country’s willingness to act, it did not take hold there until the end of war. This process is closely connected to the (particularistic) ethnic politics of Jewish organizations that have succeeded in putting the Holocaust on the public agenda, culminating in the inauguration of the US Holocaust Memorial in Washington in 1993. In order for this particularism to work, it needed to be framed in ‘American’ and more universal terms. The former director of the museum describes its mission as follows:

... to tell the story of the Holocaust in such a way that it would resonate not only with the survivor in New York and his children in San Francisco, but with a black leader from Atlanta, a Midwestern farmer, or a Northeastern industrialist. Millions of Americans make pilgrimages to Washington; the Holocaust museum must take them back in time, transport them to another continent, and inform their current reality. The Americanization of the Holocaust is an honorable task provided that the story told is faithful to the historical event. (Berenbaum, 1990: 20)

There are numerous reasons why the particularization of the Holocaust among the Jewish elite contributed to the universalization of the Holocaust among Americans as a whole. To begin with, the campaign to make the Holocaust a central element in American life was a great success. It allocated Jews a privileged role as victims, but it also gave to America a privileged role as witness by emphasizing the moral failures of passive by-standerdom. Since the politics of victimization are largely based on identification, non-Jewish Americans have come to identify en masse with Holocaust victims and now count themselves among the primary keepers of the flame of remembrance – which is why they have a Holocaust museum or memorial in almost every large city. The same year the museum was inaugurated witnessed one of the largest ‘popular culture’ successes in diffusing the Holocaust: Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List. It greatly contributed to the universalization of the Holocaust insofar as it tells a moral story of good against evil rather than the tale of Jewish victims. Despite its ‘authentic’ setting, it appears as de-contextualized from history, as the Jewish victims are secondary to the conflict between the evil Nazi (Goeth) and the good human being (Schindler). While cultural critics damned the movie for the vulgar ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust (see Hansen, 1996; Loshitzky, 1997), a large public was increasingly sensitized to the evils of genocide and the moral responsibility not to stand by and witness the murder of innocent civilians. This was a time when no nation could isolate the memory of the Holocaust from these transnational processes.

However, it was the historical backdrop of the Balkan crisis and unsuccessful demands for Nato intervention in Bosnia that helped establish the link and thus the centrality of the Holocaust as a measure stick for international politics and a transnational value system. The museum’s emphasis on by-standerism and the
movie's enactment of a morality tale, with clearly designated roles of good and evil, resonated with emerging views of preventing genocide in the Balkans and how to proceed with military interventions. It was no other than Elie Wiesel who on the day of the museum's inauguration directly turned to President Clinton saying that: 'As a Jew I say that we have to do something to stop the bloodshed in this country [Bosnia]. People fight and children die. Why? Something, no matter what, must be done' (Linenthal, 1995: 262).

The unfolding of this universalizing process is well illustrated in the German case. In that country, 'Holocaust uniqueness' was the symbolic weapon of the Liberal Left, like Jürgen Habermas (1998), wanting to reconnect Germany to its Western Enlightenment tradition, while Conservatives tried to 'universalize' the Holocaust by comparing the Nazi crimes with the crimes of Stalinism, in order to free Germany from its particular stain, thus facilitating the resurgence of a sense of national pride (Levy, 1999). The end of the Cold War and the conflict in the Balkans triggered a re-organization of these concepts. On the Right, there was immediate sympathy for the Croatians, not because of the Holocaust but rather in spite of it - i.e. on the basis of the cultural similarities and historical ties that had also underlain the Second World War alliance. On the Left, the Holocaust was an immediate frame of reference, but it led to the opposite conclusion from the one drawn by many Americans. Since the Holocaust was identified with German militarism, it followed that German intervention should be opposed, and by analogy so should all intervention by Germany's allies. During the Gulf War Germany was still reluctant to participate in the Nato alliance, but with memories of the consequences of belated intervention in Bosnia and the war in Kosovo being framed as genocide, the position of the Left in Germany changed. Memories of the Holocaust as well as of Germany's militaristic tradition were frequently cited by those objecting to Germany's participation in military interventions.

In the context of the Kosovo war these arguments were inverted. Kosovo was a globally televised morality play. The war was repeatedly justified with metaphors articulated in reference to the 'lessons of the Holocaust'. References to the Holocaust featured prominently in articulating a moral and political response to Kosovo. In contrast to genocidal activities in Ruanda, interethnic warfare in Kosovo with its European setting and its televised images resonated with Holocaust iconography. Military involvement in Kosovo was primarily framed as a moral obligation largely in response to previous failures to intervene on behalf of innocent civilians. Now it was precisely these memories that legitimized Germany's involvement. 'Never again Auschwitz' was frequently invoked, but it was no longer only the failure to stop the Holocaust. The slogan of 'Never Again' was simultaneously a reminder of the Second World War and the delayed involvement in Bosnia. This transposition of Holocaust memory onto contemporary sensibilities about genocide provided the foundation for emerging cosmopolitan memories. Similar processes of de-contextualizing the Holocaust were also evident in the numerous Israeli reactions to the Kosovo conflict. Different political forces projected competing visions of victimhood: identifying the
Serbsians as Nazis, the Albanians as Jews, the Palestinians as Albanians, etc., all depending on their ideological orientations. They were mapping Holocaust memories onto the continuous conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.

Overall, the frequent invocation of the Holocaust raised public awareness to questions of uniqueness and comparability, and the use of the past in general. As such, Kosovo and its connection to the Holocaust greatly contributed to an increasingly self-reflexive form of globalized memory, drawing on its universal message. The Kosovo conflict and its worldwide reception thus constitute a decisive break for the dominance of nation-centered memories. International reaction against 'ethnic cleansing' and 'violation of human rights' are expressions of a value change in the global world. Two aspects of the globalization process deserve special attention in this respect: the de-territorialization of sovereign jurisdiction and the concomitant diminution of national decision-making processes. State authority is being newly determined. Human rights are the new measure for a global politics, shaping the ways in which state authority is exercised. While the sovereignty of states remains intact, their autonomy to determine the scope of solidarities in purely national terms is diminished. New transnational solidarities have the potential to emerge. The decontextualized memory of the Holocaust facilitates this. In its 'universalized' and 'Americanized' form, it provides Europeans with a new sense of 'common memory'.

Europe thus faces an entirely new situation. The Holocaust took place in Europe. In the general European memory the Holocaust has now assumed a more central position than other events related to the Second World War. The Nuremberg trials at first reinforced the general sense that humanity had to be juxtaposed to the crimes of German chauvinism and Nazism. However, this was more a top-down experience that the Allies sought to impose as part of their reeducation program. The emerging Cold War soon interrupted these universal interpretations. Subsequently, and also in response to domestic changes, memories of the Holocaust were re-nationalized, so to speak. The end of the Cold War has led to a fundamental change in the parameters of collective memories in Europe and made possible attempts to produce shared cosmopolitan memories.

The Stockholm Forum

The Intergovernmental Conference on the Holocaust, which took place in Stockholm in January 2000, provides a good example for the deterritorialization and the institutionalization of cosmopolitan memories. The conference was attended by high-ranking European politicians and contained a new global debate on values. Here 'culture' offered 'politics' a template about how a unified Europe, the site of the historical Holocaust, could imagine itself as a community of shared values, greatly contributing to the institutionalization of a European memory. The prevention of another Holocaust became a civilizational foundation of a new official European memory. The privileged nation of yesteryear was subsumed under a powerful symbolism of a victim-centered cosmopolitan memory. This memory, in turn, becomes a prime legitimating force for future military and
non-military interventions to prevent future genocides, which have been added to a growing list of risks and uncertainties typifying the experience of people in global times.

A closer look at the final declaration of the Stockholm Forum illustrates the institutionalization of an emerging European cosmopolitan memory (for the entire text see: http://www.holocaustforum.gov.se/). Its first article states:

The Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning. After half a century, it remains an event close enough in time that survivors can still bear witness to the horrors that engulfed the Jewish people. The terrible suffering of the many millions of other victims of the Nazis has left an indelible scar across Europe as well.

The second article emphasizes the ‘witness’ perspective and calls for active intervention and compassion for the victims:

The magnitude of the Holocaust, planned and carried out by the Nazis, must be forever seared in our collective memory. The selfless sacrifices of those who defied the Nazis, and sometimes gave their own lives to protect or rescue the Holocaust’s victims, must also be inscribed in our hearts. The depths of that horror, and the heights of their heroism, can be touchstones in our understanding of the human capacity for evil and for good.

But it goes further than that. Moral categories like ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are being connected to a new European duty to act:

With humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils. Together we must uphold the terrible truth of the Holocaust against those who deny it. We must strengthen the moral commitment of our peoples, and the political commitment of our governments, to ensure that future generations can understand the causes of the Holocaust and reflect upon its consequences.

Based on our analysis, we identify four ways the Holocaust can be universalized: as far as the victims are concerned in the past (was it the Jews plus a supporting cast, or many different peoples who suffered?); as far as the victims are concerned in the future (is the lesson Never Again for the Jews, or Never Again for Anyone?); as far as the perpetrators are concerned in the past (were the Nazis uniquely evil, or were they only different in quantity from other mass murderers?); and as far as the subjects in the present are concerned (who remembers? i.e. who has the right to pronounce the truth of the Holocaust?). In a newly European ‘cosmopolitan’ memory, the Holocaust future (and not the past) is now considered in absolutely universal terms: it can happen to anyone, at anytime, and everyone is responsible.

This future-oriented dimension is a defining feature of cosmopolitan memory. It is not a memory that is solely looking toward the past to produce a formative myth. Discussions about post-national collectivities are mostly focused on the future. Post-national solidarity is largely based on the recognition and the
desire to prevent or limit future ecological disasters. Through the war in the Balkans a new risk has surfaced: genocide. We distinguish here between those memories that are directed toward the past, and future oriented forms of cosmopolitan memory. During the period of strong national states, the past served the myth of national continuity. This is beginning to change. Collective memories are frequently based on self-reflexive notions. After the transformation of religion due to secularization, we are now witnessing the disenchantment of the nation and the recognition of discontinuities. Cosmopolitan memory thus also implies that the future can no longer be controlled through the past. Like the present it cannot be planned any longer. The Holocaust and the ongoing cosmopolitanization of memories have come to symbolize a world of uncertainties. Collective memory has the potential to be freed from naturalized categories (e.g. the nation) and is expressed in symbols (e.g. the Holocaust) that provide a meaningful framework to face an uncertain future. But this future is not what it used to be: namely linear and sustained by a belief in progress. To be sure, this transition is riddled with tensions and uncertainties stemming from the declining ability of the nation-state to supply meaningful categories for collective identifications.

Historical memories of the Holocaust are rhetorically connected with the ‘fresh’ memory of genocide in the Balkans. A new future-oriented memory is being put in place. The Holocaust is turned into a holocaust and becomes a de-contextualized symbol. This is made clear in the last article of the declaration:

It is appropriate that this, the first major international conference of the new millennium, declares its commitment to plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past. We empathize with the victims’ suffering and draw inspiration from their struggle. Our commitment must be to remember the victims who perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice.

The Holocaust represents the civilization break of modernity and the dividing line to barbarity. As such, it corresponds to the uncertainties about our own world and especially the discontinuities that exemplify the transition to global modernity. The Stockholm Declaration greatly contributes to the creation of a common European cultural memory, especially in light of the continuous criticism that it otherwise lacks a shared heritage. It is precisely the abstract nature of ‘good and evil’ that symbolizes the Holocaust, which contributes to the extra-territorial quality of cosmopolitan memory. After the Cold War the Holocaust is officially part of European memory and becomes a new founding moment for the idea of European civilization. A day that serves as a reminder for the liberation of Auschwitz, 27 January, has become the first (official) European commemoration of the third millennium.

Conclusion

It is telling that this process seems to come to fruition precisely at a time when single European states have started to reflect on their own conduct during the
Second World War. ‘Inventions of Nationhood’ during the nineteenth century were based on heroic conceptions and formative myths that were transmitted by ‘traditional’ and ‘exemplary’ forms of narrativity (Rüsen, 1982). In contrast, the Holocaust has been inscribed in the historical awareness of West European nations (and increasingly also in Eastern Europe) during the last quarter of the twentieth century, a period characterized by a self-critical narrative of their national past. While traditional and exemplary narratives deploy historical events to promote foundational myth, the critical narrative emphasizes events that focus on past injustices of one’s own nation. Cosmopolitan memory thus implies some recognition of the history (and the memories) of the ‘Other’. The heroic narrative of First Modernity (Ulrich Beck, 2000, 2001) is the narrative of ‘acting perpetrators’. In contrast, the paradigmatic narrative of Second Modernity becomes the narrative of the ‘non-acting’ victim. In First Modernity this distinction between perpetrator and victim constituted a crucial element for misunderstanding and mutual disdain. In Second Modernity we detect a compromise that is based on the mutual recognition of the history of the ‘Other’. It is this act of reconciliation which becomes the central mnemonic event. Half a century after the Holocaust, it is no longer the atrocities themselves that are at the center of attention (especially in light of the fact that the majority of surviving victims have died), but how the heirs of the victims, the perpetrators and bystanders are coping with these stories and the evolving memories. In other words, the recognition of the ‘Other’ diffuses the distinction between memories of victims and perpetrators. What remains is the memory of a shared past. It is not shared due to some mythical desires and the belonging to some continuing community of fate, but as the product of a reflexive choice to incorporate the suffering of the ‘Other’, constituting what we have referred to here as cosmopolitan memory. Global media representations and emerging interdependencies create new cosmopolitan sensibilities and moral-political obligations (Tester, 1999). The concept of ‘cosmopolitan memory’ corresponds to the globalized horizon of experiences in Second Modernity. Cosmopolitan memories thus provide a new epistemological vantage point, one that questions the ‘methodological nationalism’ that still prevails in much of the social sciences.

Notes

1 The classics of sociology are so thoroughly pervaded with a spatially-fixed understanding of culture that it is rarely remarked upon (Tomlinson, 1999). It is a conception that goes back to sociology’s birth amidst the nineteenth-century formation of nation-states. Ironically, the territorial conception of culture – the idea of culture as ‘rooted’ – was itself a reaction to the enormous changes that were going on as that century turned into the twentieth. It was a conscious attempt to provide a solution to the ‘uprooting’ of local cultures that the formation of nation-states necessarily involved. Sociology understood the new symbols and common values above all as means of integration into a new unity. The triumph of this perspective can be seen in the way the nation-state has ceased to appear as a project and a construct and has become instead
widely regarded as something natural, as something that has always existed (Beck, 2000). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, globalization is posing a challenge to this idea that binding history and borders tightly together is the only possible means of social and symbolic integration.

2 A full treatment of the historical processes underlying our theoretical claims is beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed account see our forthcoming book Erinnerung im Globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust.

3 The indictment is available as a single text document at http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/nuremberg/plead.html/. There is a hypertext version, along with an archive of related materials, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/count.htm/

4 This is also the background for the critique the Frankfurt School launched against modernity. Here the dark side of modernization was emphatically stressed.

5 For a detailed account see the articles in ‘War and Social Theory’, special issue of European Journal of Social Theory 4(1), 2001.

6 For a detailed account of the ethnic and political fights regarding the museum, see Linenthal (1995) and Novick (1999).

7 For an analysis of German and Israeli newspapers during the time of the crisis, see Levy and Szaider (2001).

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