

State University of New York at Stony Brook  
**Department of Philosophy**  
**2019 Lecture Series**

You are cordially invited to a  
lecture by

**Francois Raffoul**  
**Louisiana State University**  
**Lecture:**

**“The Phenomenology of the Inapparent”**

**Francois Raffoul** is professor of Philosophy at Louisiana State University. He is the author of *Heidegger and the Subject* (Prometheus Books, 1999), *A Chaque fois Mien* (Galilée, Paris, 2004), *The Origins of Responsibility* (Indiana University Press, 2010) and *Thinking the Event* (Indiana University Press, 2020). He has co-edited several volumes, *Disseminating Lacan* (SUNY Press, 1996), *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy* (SUNY Press, 2002), *Rethinking Facticity* (SUNY Press, 2008), *French Interpretations of Heidegger* (SUNY Press, 2008) and more recently *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger* (2014, 2016). He has co-translated several French philosophers, in particular Jacques Derrida (“*Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce*”, in *Derrida and Joyce: Texts and Contexts*, SUNY Press, 2013), Jean-Luc Nancy (*The Title of the Letter: a Reading of Lacan* (1992), *The Gravity of Thought* (1998), *The Creation of the World or Globalization* (2007) and *Identity* (Fordham U. Press, 2013), and Dominique Janicaud’s *Heidegger in France* (Indiana University Press, 2015). He is the co-editor of a book series at SUNY Press, entitled *Contemporary French Thought*.

I will explore in this paper the significations of the expression, “The Phenomenology of the Inapparent,” which was characterized by Heidegger in a late seminar as the most authentic sense of phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally been considered to be a thought of presence, assigned to a phenomenon that is identified with the present being, or with an object for consciousness: the very term “phenomenon” has its roots in the Greek verb *phainestai*, which means “to appear,” “to show itself.” However, I will suggest that phenomenology is inhabited by the presence of a certain unappearing dimension, to which it belongs, whether it knows it or not. I will first show in what sense the “inapparent” plays in phenomenality and in phenomenology, through the work of Martin Heidegger. I will then envisage the inapparent in Emmanuel Levinas’s corpus in terms of the invisibility of the face, revealing its ethical import. I will in closing engage Derrida’s radicalization of what he calls a “secret” in experience. Ultimately, I will argue that the presence of such inapparent transforms the very concept of phenomenology.

**October 16<sup>th</sup>, 2019**  
**1:00 pm**  
**Harriman Hall 214**

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