The question of the beginning in Hegel’s philosophy is one of the most controversial points in Hegel scholarship – 100 different Hegel researchers will give you a hundred different (sometimes contradictory) answers: a Babylonian babble of voices. In the passage With What Must the Science Begin? of his Science of Logic it is sufficiently clear what Hegel intended with the paradoxical dictum of a third philosophy that would be neither dogmatism nor scepticism, neither realism nor constructivism, but both. It seems that the logical beginning can thus be taken in two ways, in a mediated or an immediate way. Hegel highlights that “there is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity.” Thinking is the mediation and sublation of mediation, just as it is the immediacy and sublation of the immediate. The inseparability of the opposing determinations must be thought together in their totality; this also applies to the beginning – no exception is possible.