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Revolutionaries, Radicals, and Repression During the Global Sixties and Subversive Seventies

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QUITE RECENTLY, a new historiographical paradigm has emerged that is pressing upon scholars of the Cold War period, and particularly of the mid-Cold War era (c. 1955–75). This paradigm looks to situate analyses of nation-state processes within a wider conceptual frame, one that encompasses a deeper awareness of geopolitics while adopting a transnational lens through which to interpret local cultural and ideological practices. The label “Global Sixties” has been increasingly attached to this new interpretative perspective, and its rapid spread, in particular among scholars who approach the period through analysis of the Third World, is a strong indicator of the paradigm’s resonance.1 In the brief essay that follows, I would like to outline the key defining elements of this paradigm and to make a case for how and why we, as scholars of Mexico, need to take into consideration the global context—beyond that of the U.S.-Mexican relationship—in our ongoing reconceptualization of the relationship between the state, youth movements, and political violence during this period.

A GLOBAL SIXTIES AGENDA

To invoke the term Global Sixties is to reference simultaneously a unique epistemological frame of analysis, one that takes as a given a deep embeddedness
of transnational linkages, and a particular if loosely defined periodization. In
my efforts to define the term, the Global Sixties represents "a new conceptual
approach to understanding local change within a transnational framework, one
constituted by multiple crosscurrents of geopolitical, ideological, cultural, and
economic forces. Such forces produced a simultaneity of 'like' responses across
disparate geographical contexts, suggesting interlocking causes. For me, there
are two intersecting axes to the Global Sixties (here, with an emphasis on Mexi
can) that define this new epistemological approach.

The first is that of geopolitics. Mexico was a major Cold War actor with
internationalist aspirations throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, it is no
longer possible to think about Mexico during this period without situating
national and regional-level politics within a global framework. We must do so,
moreover, not simply by incorporating these internationalist aspirations in
anecdotal terms, as descriptive points of reference, but rather by considering
the motivating forces behind those aspirations and locating their interrela-
tionship with national and local-level politics and social history. By reposition-
ing Mexico as a Cold War actor of consequence—shaped by and as an agent of
the international Cold War—we will not only gain a deeper understanding of
Mexico as a global state actor, but, crucially, we will also transcend a narrower
framework that too frequently confabulates "Cold War" with the United States and
thus presupposes that Mexico had little agency (much less, motive) to act within
a fluid geopolitical context.

The second axis that defines this new epistemological approach courses along
what Mary Kay Vaughan has recently defined as "affective subjectivity." Using
an innovative methodological approach in which she integrates biographical
history with perceptive readings of mass cultural, individual artistic, and state-
produced cultural texts and projects, Vaughan delineates and brings to life shifts
in the structure of feeling that characterized succeeding generations of urban
Mexico City youth—or, to be certain, a particular element of those youth—
who came of age during the 1950s through the 1970s. By charting such shifts in
affective subjectivity, Vaughan makes the case that newly emergent discourses
and practices related to transforming conceptualizations of "youth" and "liber-
ation" were inextricably embedded within transnational flows of cultural and
ideological influence. While the geopolitical axis that defines the idea of a
Global Sixties thus urges us to situate Mexico within the fluid dynamics of Cold
War diplomacy, the axis of "affective sentiment" exposes the "global" within local
practices and discourse.

Efforts to reach consensus on how to "periodize" the Global Sixties inevi-
tably conflict with competing interpretations of start and end points. This is
how it should be, as disagreements over periodization help to reveal conflicting
interpretations over what constitutes a critical juncture within particular
national contexts. Thus Jaime Pensado, for instance, adopts a starting point
of 1956 in his discussion of a Mexican "Long Sixties," adopting the year of
the confiscative student strike at the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (National
Polytechnic Institute, IPN) as the key event that set in motion a shift in the
culture of student protest and public perceptions about youth more generally.
Others look outward for starting points, as does Renata Keller who regards the
Cuban Revolution in 1959 as a starting point. Similarly, establishing when the
1960s "ended" is also an important point to contemplate. Louise Walker
points to 1973 as a "crisis year" that marked a shift toward new forms of politi-
cal mobilization and state surveillance, a shift that heralded the endpoint of the
"Mexican Miracle." Walker situates this turning point within a global context
and thereby underscores the centrality of the OPEC oil crisis to an interpre-
tation of Mexican national and domestic politics. It is important that we have
these debates over periodization, as they help us to clarify historical turning
points and contribute to the important discussions about interlocking causes.

At the same time, I would argue that what is still missing from this discus-
sion is a conversation about turning points within the Global Sixties historical
framework. In continuing to discuss the Global Sixties—or "long 1960s"—as
a single period, we risk the danger of perpetuating a nebulous conceptual
category, one that may unintentionally conflate significant temporal shifts within
this time frame. Equally important, we need to initiate a conversation about
how the Global Sixties framework lays the basis for interpreting what comes
next—in the 1970s and 1980s. As the essays in this collection reveal, there is
both continuity and disjuncture between the "long 1960s" and the latter period.
Yet there is no clearly emergent paradigm that might encompass the diverse
investigations in the 1970s and 1980s. The original research included in this
collection provides an excellent opportunity for us to begin a conceptualization
of a succeeding historical era, one that builds upon, engages, and hopefully helps
to redefine the Global Sixties paradigm.

In short, it is no longer possible to think about Mexico in the 1960s and 70s
without situating the nation-state within a global framework. This has special
bearing on how and when one deploys the term guerra sucia, a phrase that
Mexicanists have eagerly embraced to define the period c. 1965–78, an expanded
time frame, and one that encompasses many of the essays in this collection. Mexico's Dirty Wars were deeply permeated by geopolitical upheavals and transnational forces, from the oil crises induced by OPEC and the emergence of détente, to the impact of Maoism and rise of countercultural refusal. The insistence by the scholars in this collection to align Mexico's Dirty War within a broader Latin American trend is crucial to debunking long-standing notions of Mexican “exceptionalism.” Mexico's “perfect dictatorship” masked dark episodes of violence and a prolonged strategy of low-intensity conflict, especially in the countryside. At the same time, however, we must situate Mexico's Dirty War within a global context as well, just as those studying the Southern Cone have done. Only by doing so will we make our work increasingly relevant to non-Mexicanists. At the same time, this move to “globalize” Mexican history will push scholars to account for the embedded motivations, sentiment, and global parameters in which these otherwise “local” histories occur. The crucial challenge of such an approach is that we seek to identify the interconnections among geopolitics, regional identifications, state-level struggles to consolidate a “national form” and local contestations that reconfigure the discourse, signifiers, and practices of global dissent.

GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In geopolitical terms, it is essential that we pivot away from the traditional bilateral axis of U.S.-Mexican relations and expand our investigative reach to grasp the complexities of a dynamic global landscape that defined the Cold War. Mexico's geopolitics clearly encompass far more than that country's relationship with the United States, a false premise that Tanya Harmer, Vanni Pettinà, and others have recently pushed historians to acknowledge. The bilateral relationship was clearly central to Mexican national and international relations, but analytically it is overdetermined as well. It is striking, for instance, how references to Mexico's broader internationalist agenda—whether when addressing state-to-state politics or in examining left- or right-wing ideological currents—far too often become linked, almost tautologically, to U.S. strategic influence and decision-making. The wider geopolitical context mattered especially because actors across the political spectrum believed, at different moments, in the real potential for an assertive Mexican leadership in global affairs and thus in the possibilities of breaking free of U.S. dominance.

One important area of investigation is to revisit the relationship between the Communist world and Mexico, a relationship that far too often is presented simply in terms of a false dichotomy between the forces of “communism” versus “anticommunism.” By the late 1950s and throughout the early 1960s, the Soviet model of economic development—with its emphasis on state-led growth and a push for heavy industrialization—coincided in important ways with the developmentalist outlook of Mexico as well as other Latin American governments. Indeed, the Soviet Union prepared an ambitious and calculated strategy to gain widespread diplomatic approval in Latin America. This was the high point of what Soviet international diplomacy labeled a policy of “peaceful coexistence,” and, prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis at least, various governments across Latin America showed an eagerness to harness the possibilities of geopolitical “balancing” by engaging diplomatically and economically with the Soviet bloc. From the Soviet perspective, this approach entailed proffering favorable trade relations and support for critical industries, such as oil refineries, as well as a broader “cultural offensive” that included, for example, support for Soviet bloc film festivals, musical performances, and other cultural presentations. Ironically, these efforts to normalize Soviet relations with Latin America were hindered by Khrushchev's increasingly strident support for revolutionary Cuba, a relationship that had more to do with Soviet competition with communist China for leadership within the emergent Third World than a genuine alignment of strategic interests with Cuba's own revolutionary goals.

My point is that Soviet outreach to the Americas (leaving aside the Cuban Revolution) created an important opportunity for certain Latin American governments, Mexico included, to diversify their international relations and thereby gain bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States. The embrace, in other words, was mutual, even if the geopolitical motives mostly diverged. Much to U.S. State Department consternation, there was a respectful attitude expressed by a cross-section of Mexican society toward the seemingly spectacular Soviet advances in science, industry, and agriculture. Many Mexicans, moreover, pointed to shared historical trajectories between the Russian and Mexican revolutions, a trope that was reiterated in various ways when Soviet Vice-Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Mexico in the fall of 1959—the highest-level Soviet official to travel to Latin America up to that moment—to inaugurate the Soviet Exhibition of Science, Technology, and Culture. Thus, the otherwise resolutely anticommunist newspaper Excelsior editorialized about the exhibition, “There is indeed much that we can learn from Soviet advances.”
Indeed, Mexican diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with the Soviet Union remain woefully underexplored for the 1960s and 1970s. In the wake of Mikoyan’s visit, for instance, there was a concerted yet ultimately frustrated series of efforts to establish meaningful economic ties, while at the same time diplomatic gestures prospered. Although President López Mateos never traveled to the Soviet Union (despite an invitation from Khrushchev to do so), his foreign policy aspirations included direct engagement with various Eastern bloc nations, notably in an official state visit to Poland and Yugoslavia, and a level of diplomacy that elements on the Mexican Left viewed favorably as a proxy for the nation’s defiance of U.S. Cold War expectations. Indeed, scattered throughout the 1960s one can locate intriguing glimmers into a relationship that was clearly far more complex, and quite likely of mutual benefit, than the prevailing “anticommunist” interpretation of Mexican state policies would otherwise lead us to believe. For instance, although President Díaz Ordaz retreated from the high-profile internationalism of his predecessor, and in 1968 cast blame on a communist conspiracy to undermine his presidency, his administration nevertheless promoted an elaborate mission of cultural diplomacy with Soviet bloc nations. These ties bore evident fruit in the widespread availability of Soviet films, books, performances, and other cultural manifestations to Mexican citizens from the 1960s through the 1980s.

Another dimension of the relationship between Mexico and the communist nations concerns diplomatic and cultural relations with China and the ways in which Maoism was disseminated and refracted through Mexican political discourse. Too often scholars conflate positions of “communism” and “anticommunism” with the Soviet Union alone, a perspective that detracts from our understanding of how the Chinese revolution was interpreted both by the general public as well as within left-wing intellectual and student circles. Outside of Cuba, China had no formal relationship with any government in Latin America until Salvador Allende breached this de facto blockade and established diplomatic ties in late 1970. Mexico followed in quick succession (bucking the United States, which did not establish diplomatic relations until 1979), thus signaling an eagerness to explore the geopolitical opportunities created by détente. Curiously, Mexico’s diplomatic opening to China coincided with the emergence of Maoist-influenced left-wing movements. Indeed, we need to learn much more about how the Cultural Revolution (c. 1966–71), on one hand, and Mexico’s diplomatic opening to China, on the other, played a role in delaying (or inspiring) this turn toward Maoism. It is notable, for instance, that Maoism does not attain significant influence among Mexican youth nor is Maoism transformed into revolutionary praxis until the early 1970s, practically a decade after the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Similarly, there has been almost no discussion concerning the relationship between the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Mexico. In the summer of 1961, U.S. State Department officials breathed a sigh of relief when it became evident that Mexico would not in fact send an official representative to the founding meeting of NAM, held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, that September. Nevertheless, throughout the early 1960s official state policy articulated an ideological affiliation with the political and economic objectives of NAM and Cold War “neutralism” more generally. Thus, while never formally joining NAM, President López Mateos paid official visits to key nonaligned countries, including Indonesia, India, and Yugoslavia, and reciprocated with elaborately state receptions for the principal statesmen identified with the NAM movement (Sukarno, Nehru, and Tito). Moreover, an outcrop of this early “flirtation” with nonalignment was Mexico’s role in cofounding the Group of 77, a (mostly) Third World caucus that by the mid-1960s would push for a transformation in global economic trade relations and whose focus was central to the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The first international conference of UNCTAD, held in Geneva in 1964, was a watershed moment in the articulation of a critique of the global capitalist order, and Mexico’s sustained engagement with UNCTAD throughout the 1960s helps to account for the subsequent proposal of a “New International Economic Order” by President Luis Echeverría in the 1970s. Indeed, a deeper appreciation of Mexico’s ideological affiliations with NAM during its founding period, coupled with Mexican activism within the Group of 77, helps to clarify Echeverría’s internationalism and to pivot away from the overly simplistic argument that Echeverría’s global travels and leadership within the United Nations merely reflected efforts to “co-opt” the Left. There is still much to disentangle in terms of how the logic of presidential internationalism intersected and conflicted with the logics of left-wing mobilization, collaboration, and confrontation, not only in the period of Echeverría, but also during the presidency of López Mateos and even, perhaps somewhat differently speaking, under Díaz Ordaz.

Finally, we need to move away from a geopolitical framework that elevates the relevancy of the Cuban Revolution as the primary focal point for interpreting left-wing mobilizations and countermobilizations during this period. As Renata Keller has amply demonstrated, the Cuban Revolution was deeply imbricated in the logic of U.S.–Mexican relations, as well as for political activism (on the Left as well as the Right). Yet analogous to the distortions that singular
attention to the 1968 student movement has had on the historiography, overly focusing on the centrality of the Cuban Revolution similarly distracts historians from grasping not only a more complex regional and international diplomacy but also the multitudinous influences (ideological and cultural) on Mexican youth’s “affective sentiment.” Indeed, the Cuban Revolution became an impediment to Mexico’s regional (and international) leadership aspirations, even while also serving as a useful tool, as Keller argues, to help contain an explosion of revolutionary fervor.

COLD WAR TRANSNATIONALISMS

As we seek to come to a clearer understanding of the shifting aspirations and complexities of Mexico’s geopolitical configuration, there is also the need to understand the motives and repercussions from the scores of individuals who made pilgrimages, mostly voluntarily, to centers of revolutionary activism. These travels began during the 1950s and accelerated into the 1960s and 1970s, when numerous Mexican youth went to the Soviet Union (including throughout the Eastern bloc) and Cuba, as well as to China, North Korea, and quite likely other sites of political fervor. Some pursued training in revolutionary methods, while many more traveled as part of international delegations that attended gatherings such as those hosted by the Soviet-backed World Peace Council or socialist youth festivals. As Patrick Iber explores in his recent book, regional and global solidarity conferences mobilized tens of thousands of participants, mostly youth, around appeals to world peace and, later, global socialist revolution. These gatherings were important ideological and cultural contact zones as well as places of intersection, cross-pollination, and intellectual enthusiasm that would have an important impact on how youth interpreted and acted within their social networks.

Another example comes from youth who traveled to Communist bloc countries to study. One notable location in that regard was the Peoples’ Friendship University in Moscow, which opened its doors in 1960 and shortly thereafter was renamed the Patrice Lumumba People’s Friendship University in honor of the martyred Congolese independence leader. During the 1960s and 1970s, Mexicans joined with hundreds if not thousands of other Latin Americans, as well as those from other continents, who took up residency at the university and in turn helped transform the school and dormitories into a home away from home for university-age students from across the global south. To date, we know very little about their experiences there and how those experiences shaped their later political and social identities. For instance, in my own archival research I encountered brief references to Mexican students studying in the Soviet Union who complained of poor conditions and racial discrimination. These pilgrimages continued and likely even accelerated during the 1970s, when Mexican-Soviet relations became further normalized. 17

Who were these young individuals and what were the social and ideological forces that motivated them to travel abroad, whether to participate in an international conference or youth festival, to enroll in university, or, in smaller numbers, to gain knowledge of guerilla warfare? What kinds of friendships and romances were forged? How were ideas and differences regarding politics, the aesthetics and ethics of revolutionary praxis, and global knowledge of events transmitted? In what ways did interactions in these contact zones lay a foundation for future relationships—and disagreements—that spanned the global divide and thus helped to shape the intellectual and political dimensions of the Global Sixties?

There is also the underexplored realm of right-wing youth in Mexico and the ways in which their own travels mirrored in fundamental ways those of their left-wing counterparts. As Jaime Pensado has cogently documented, we must not conflate the categories of “youth” and “Left” during this period, as is too often the case. 18 Many youth were far less inclined to support the political activism and performative speech acts of their left-wing peers than most scholars have felt comfortable to presume. Moreover, as Luis Herrán documents, an emboldened right-wing conservative movement, with points of organizational contact spread across the globe, emerged in tandem with the left-wing frontist politics of the Soviet World Peace Council and Cuba’s Casa de las Américas. 19 During the 1960s and 70s, organizations such as the World Anti-Communist League, with its multiple regional and local-level affiliate groups, grew in strength with its pledge to counter the perceived threat of a vast left-wing communist conspiracy. These organizations were deeply intertwined with religious politics, especially emanating from the Catholic Church. Yet Catholicism was shaped by the competing forces of liberation theology and social conservatism; like “youth,” we cannot reduce Catholicism to a single category. These religious currents, too, were situated in constant dialogue with elements external to the nation-state. The Global Sixties framework allows us to encompass this far more complex notion of “youth politics” and thus to begin to recognize the deeper implications of ideological polarization.
We also need to delve more profoundly into the ways in which cultural practices were globally contextualized. Recent work on Latin America has brought to light the numerous pathways by which the sounds, imagery, and aesthetic sensibilities crisscrossed the Atlantic and, in doing so, enmeshed themselves within local, national, and regional contexts of youth consumptive practices and activism. There is much, however, to explore for Mexico in this regard. This is especially true for the 1970s, when we see a resurgence of state-sponsored and underground artistic movements, as well as the explosion of new forms of identity regarding what it meant to be young, defiant, and engaged in transforming the world as it was. One is struck, for instance, by the “dropping out” of youth reflected in the spread of jípismo (the hippie movement) and communal living options, concurrent with an increased ideological rigidity of a newfound compromiso (political commitment) as many youth (on the Left and Right) policed themselves and one another for ideologically suspect cultural practices that might detract from commitment to revolutionary and counterrevolutionary struggle. How did hair style, fashion, language, and musical tastes, among other points of reference, speak to and about youth of different ideological positions?

In what ways did social class shape the response of youth to these consumptive practices? What was the impact of market forces (national and transnational) on establishing access to and thus defining the “value” of cultural consumption? How were such points of reference mobilized by state agencies, by parental authorities, by political parties, and in quotidian exchanges to define not only “which side” one was on but what constituted the boundaries between “national” and “foreign,” “Right” and “Left” in an era when regional and global affinities were in dramatic flux?

One of the concerns raised by participants in the conference that gave rise to this volume was that the insertion of Mexico within a Global Sixties paradigm risked subsuming local and regional histories into a wider narrative. As Michael Soldatenko asked, what do we lose in terms of the “autonomy of local stories” when we approach Mexico globally? This is an important question and one that highlights the significance of research taking place at the regional level. For too long, these narratives have been doubly “provincialized”—overshadowed by the drama of social movements that occurred in Mexico City (the 1968 student movement is the prime example here) and marginalized by a bias that has tended to conflate the capital with the “nation.” The excellent research taking place outside of Mexico City will continue to push the historiography of Cold War Mexico to acknowledge not only the significance of “local stories” on their own terms, but to reenvision a dominant political narrative that is still overwhelmingly grounded by events that occurred in the capital.

At the same time, no story is wholly local. This is especially the case in an era charged by the crosscurrents of ideological and cultural intercourse. If we look for them, we will discover myriad evidence of these crosscurrents embedded in even the most local of stories. This is not to diminish the autonomy of local actors but rather to acknowledge how global events shaped local narratives. At the same time, the absence of democratic process and the direct experience of economic inequalities profoundly shaped how provincial youth perceived and responded to events and ideas emanating from beyond the nation-state. A deeper probe of local and/or provincial histories thus provides us with a more nuanced understanding of how to conceptualize the relationship between local and global in this period.

Finally, in the Global Sixties, the transnational flow of people, ideas, imagery, and capital was intertwined with a perception, both in official circles and at the grassroots level, that Mexico had an opportunity to leverage a fluid geopolitical order to its advantage. We need to identify how this perception of opportunity—and the fears or aspirations of societal “collapse”—also shaped local stories and sentiment. Positioning Mexican political narratives within this global framework provides a new entry point into writing the history of modern Mexico, one that will help transcend the overbearing organizational structure dictated by the terms of changing presidential sexenios (six-year presidential terms). A rich historiography is emerging that is reconceptualizing the significance of the Cold War from the perspective of the Global South. It is a propitious moment to squarely insert Mexico within this emergent dialogue.

NOTES

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1. See the articles and introduction to the special issue on “Latin America in the Global Sixties,” The Americas. Recent volumes incorporating this label include Jian et al., Routledge Handbook; Chaplin and Pieper-Mooney, Global 1960s; Brown and Lison, Global Sixties in Sound and Vision; Christiansen and Scarlett, Third World in the Global 1960s.


4. Pensado, Rebel Mexico, 83–84.
5. Keller, Mexico’s Cold War.
6. Walker, Waking from the Dream, 47.
8. Pettinà, “Beyond U.S. Hegemony”; Harmer, Allende’s Chile; Gerrard-Burnett, Lawrence, and Moreno, Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow.
10. Friedman, Shadow Cold War.
12. Pettinà, “Bienvenido Mr. Mikoyán!”
13. Cuba established diplomatic relations with communist China in September 1960 and Canada in October 1970. The next Latin American government after Chile to establish ties was Peru in November 1971; Mexico and Argentina both followed in February 1972. Although a diplomatic opening was achieved under President Nixon, formal ties were not established by the United States until January 1979. For a recent scholarly overview of relations between key Latin American countries, including Mexico and communist China, see Rothwell, Transpacific Revolutionaries.
14. See Pettinà, “Global Horizons.” For a parallel discussion from the Brazilian perspective, see Herschberg, “‘High-Spirited Confusion.’”
15. Keller, Mexico’s Cold War.
17. A useful starting point can be found in Rupprecht, “From Russia with a Diploma: Latin American Students in the Soviet Union,” chap. 4 in Soviet Internationalism After Stalin.
18. Pensado, “To Assault with the Truth.”
20. Barr-Melej, Psychedelic Chile; Dunn, Contracultura; Markarian, Uruguay, 1968; and Manzano, The Age of Youth in Argentina.

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ZONES AND LANGUAGES OF STATE-MAKING

From Pax Priista to Dirty War

WIL G. PANSTERS

A LETTER FROM DURANGO

On May 5, 1979, rural teacher Raul Ortiz López from Topia, Durango, wrote a letter to president José López Portillo. In it he complained about the arbitrary behavior of three unknown platoons that entered the villages of Galancita, Palmarejo, and Platanar. The letter claims that soldiers attacked the local population with unnecessary force, raped women, stole from the poor, detained and physically punished entire families, and even arrested children. After appealing to the state discourse of revolutionary nationalism, Ortiz López lectures the president on the constitutional articles allegedly violated by the military, and then asks rhetorically, “Is there a special Constitution for the poor?” He closes with an ironic appeal to the president’s flagship political reform initiative: “I hope that justice is done and that under the course of your Political Reform you haven’t created spaces for the Army to impose its ‘loving’ brutality.” In a postscript, he subtly insinuates that with the president’s prompt intervention, “the people of the area don’t have to violate Article 17 of the Constitution,” which states that citizens are not allowed to take justice into their own hands and use violence to claim rights.

The army denied the charges, pointed to Special Task Force Condor, and suggested that the allegations were most likely untrue since the people in the area were involved in drug trafficking and hence could not be trusted. The commander of Task Force Condor IV, based in Badiraguato, Sinaloa, confirmed...