too, this would help Jessen in his larger aim to rescue Populism from its synonymy with parochialism (37).

Entwined with this conspiratorial conception of politics was the Populist critique of monopolistic capitalism and the corrupt centralized authority it relied upon, which animates Jessen’s account of the imperial politics of the late nineteenth century. In Congress, in the western press, and from the campaign stump, as Jessen richly illustrates, the Populists critiqued empire as a dangerous process of militarization and centralization that would hollow out American democracy, enslave labor, and expand American monopoly to overseas lands under government protection. Some Populists were not far wide of the mark in their view of how imperial state building proceeded, especially in light of the insights from Moore’s American Imperialism and the State. As California’s one-term Populist representative Curtis H. Castle put it in 1899, “All kinds and descriptions of monopolies are to be farmed out” to monopoly capitalists in the new empire who aimed to “forever bar the poor from any portion, however small, of the stolen wealth wrung from the unrequited toil of subject nations” (quoted on Jessen 163). That is not to say that Populists were concerned for the well-being of the colonized, who were considered an alien threat to the racial boundaries of the American nation-state (108–112, 165–168).

Populism and Imperialism is framed as a cautionary tale. Populist defeat at the polls and in Congress on each occasion illuminates “how patriotism and nationalism have consistently been used to silence dissent in the United States” (9). Jessen attributes the defeat of western Populism to a surging Republican Party that responded to the Populist critique by waving the bloody shirt, accusing Populist opponents of being Copperheads and traitors, and emphasizing the importance of national unity over the divisiveness of their Populist opponents. Populists were simply outdone by the patriotic bombast of wartime nationalism. Yet at other points Jessen seems willing to concede that regional and partisan divisions within the anti-imperial coalition, chiefly between western reformers and eastern Mugwumps and conservatives who eschewed the radical language of reform and attacked the threat of empire to representative government and national morality, were insurmountable obstacles to the creation of a viable opposition (180–181, 211–216, 247). One wonders too about the role that Populist enthusiasm for empire played in fracturing this fragile coalition. Still, Jessen’s work is a welcome addition to recent literature that explores the flexibility of anti-imperialism in the United States.

It is perhaps surprising that American historians have so far overlooked the powerful anti-imperial political economy of Populist anti-monopoly, but it does reflect that historians have been slow to recognize the impact of empire on U.S. domestic history in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Certainly, Jessen’s western Populists saw no such distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. These smart volumes join works by historians including Steven Hahn, Kristin Hoganson, and Allison L. Sneider, which make clear that major domestic questions of Reconstruction, the tariff, industrial reform, consumption, and women’s suffrage were debated in the context of enormous public discussion about empire. Much more work of this nature examining how empire was lived across everyday practices—in church, by readers at home, as embodied in citizenship, through visual and material culture, and as embedded in state and non-state institutions—is needed if historians are to fully grasp the power of empire in shaping domestic concerns. By way of contrast, over the past three decades and in more than 120 volumes, Manchester University Press’s Studies in Imperialism series has sustained a sharp focus on the interplay between the domestic and the imperial in British social and cultural life. There is no analogous series in the U.S. academy.

That is not to say that empire was the sole influence on what constituted “American-ness” or that all Americans were comfortable with the idea of being imperial, but that empire saturated American public and cultural life, nationally and locally. Both these volumes significantly enrich our understanding of that saturation.

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In 1900, members of the Philippine Commission, who were representatives of the American colonial government in the Philippine colony, visited the mountains of Benguet Province and saw the verdant beauty of the plateau known as Baguio. One of its visitors was the zoologist Dean C. Worcester, who, as some American historians note, would become a rich and corrupt colonial official who owned land, cattle ranches, and gold mines in Baguio—and would earn the hatred of Filipino journalists (130). This first American encounter with Baguio would seal the fate of Mountain Province and its people as essential to the project of building an American empire in the Philippines.

The natural beauty of Baguio—covered in tree ferns and dotted with fresh spring waters, located in an area 4,700 feet above sea level—so stunned the American visitors that they compared the climate to “northern New England in the late spring or early summer” (quoted on 30). Mountain Province was the tropical Adirondacks or “Wyoming in the summer” for then secretary of war William Howard Taft (1), and it was advertised later on as “the Switzerland of the Orient”...
by the first decade of U.S. colonial rule (quoted on 143). Prior to the Americans, the Spanish referred to the indigenous peoples of the region under one name, Igorroto or Igorot, though the peoples of the northern Luzon provinces of Benguet, Abra, Apayao, Kalinga, Ifugao, and Mountain Province had no collective name for their own ethnolinguistic groups. Apart from the temperate climate, the Igorots raised herds of cattle, carabaos (water buffalo), horses, and chickens. The pasturcelands were so well cultivated that the chickens raised on the mountainsides yielded meat that reminded some travelers of poultry from “the countryside of Spain” (quoted on 30). More importantly, the Benguet natives had gold. Even before the arrival of the Spaniards, the Igorots collected gold from riverbeds and mines since the seventeenth century. Baguio was a key center of gold trade in the nineteenth century, and by 1878, “four to eight thousand ounces” of gold were sold by Benguet Igorots (quoted on 32).

Thus began the American colonial project of creating what historian Rebecca Tinio McKenna calls the “American imperial pastoral.” McKenna’s brilliant and elegant book, *American Imperial Pastoral: The Architecture of U.S. Colonialism in the Philippines*, centers on the making of Baguio as an “American retreat, the transformation of Philippine pasture into American pastoral,” and what the design, construction, and use of Baguio tell us about the “figurative architecture” (3) of the American empire at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century. McKenna examines Baguio as an American hill station turned summer retreat as a “palimpsest of landscapes,” also exploring the contradictions of imperial ideology and “how rule and subjects of rule were generated in the face of Philippine resistance” (19). McKenna deftly narrates her study of the making of a colonial summer capital with the “history of capital,” or power appropriated and used by American colonialists, through a cultural materialist reading of architectural plans, maps, local histories, news accounts, popular literature, and advertising. Baguio as the American empire’s “government hill station” is a colonial structure that reveals the histories and ideologies of the white Progressives who came to the Philippine colony as colonial administrators, of the Filipino elites who collaborated with the American colonial regime, and of the Filipino indigenous communities who served as exploited labor and were racially marked by colonial officials like Dean C. Worcester as living proof of barbarism and backwardness.

McKenna’s study of Baguio as a colonial structure was difficult to read without feeling some form of American imperial nostalgia for the Baguio of the early twentieth century. At the time, the American summer capital was touted as “one of the most progressive and cleanest cities in the world . . . under the American flag” (quoted on 143). The mention of “Stetson Hats,” “Benguet Buttermilk,” “Benguet Cheese,” the American-style cottages of Baguio Country Club for white American and Filipino colonial government employees, the fresh produce in Baguio markets, the parks, the landscape views, and the “big blue hydrangeas” and “blood-red bougainvilleas” (144) all seem to paint an idyllic picture of the summer capital. But McKenna always returns to a critical reading of this “American pastoral” by extending the work of cultural critics Raymond Williams, Leo Marx, Rosalind Morris, and others. Baguio, like the classic pastoral, was a sign of power—an imperial sign of the American empire. Just as pastoral poets and painters made art about the countryside for aristocrats who made their wealth by “appropriating the countryside from peasants” (15), so did Americans build Baguio by appropriating Igorot land and labor. As McKenna puts it, “In Baguio, the US occupation became associated with nature itself—as a greensward at the center of the town site, as landscape views, as the golf green peacefully tended by Igorots, as fresh strawberries and milk on the table” (15). Baguio’s beautiful landscape, then, was created by imperial violence, underwritten by Igorot dispossession, racial objectification, land theft (such as the story of Ibaloi elite Mateo Cariño and his family), and the reengineering of nature into a “picturesque setting” that naturalized American imperial power (159).

At the turn of the century, Americans built a summer retreat on Igorot land; this retreat provided refuge from the ongoing guerrilla war conducted by Filipino revolutionaries who continued to dream and struggle for independence or kalayaan (53). Baguio was the American colonial resort created as “a great American garden miraculously blooming in the Orient” (11), as a respite from the heat of Manila, and as a site of “regeneration” for overworked colonial clerks and for battle-wearied American soldiers and their families. Building the hill station that is Baguio would prove to be the regeneration of American imperial power as well—how “good sanitation, smooth roads, sound nourishment, refreshing air, leisure, Modernity, Civilization, and Beauty” (15) were secured by the violence of empire.

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