Living Attention
On Teresa Brennan

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CHAPTER FOUR

Heidegger after Brennan

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There are many ways in which Teresa Brennan deliberately and explicitly set her work in relation to Heidegger’s. In Exhausting Modernity (2000), her point of departure is “at least informed by... the critique of foundationalism begun by Heidegger” (Brennan 2000, 14). Throughout that work, as she builds her argument in readings of Marx, Freud and Lacan, Heidegger’s name surfaces again and again showing his work to be a point of departure from which she does not quite depart, but which, rather continues to inform her readings of these others. For instance, she links his concern with the objectification of knowledge to Lacan’s theory of the objectification of knowledge, his thought of the “standing reserve” to Marx’s “standing army” and his critique of technology, more broadly speaking, to Benjamin’s thinking of physics and metaphysics.

Indeed, in History after Lacan (1993), she puts it like this: “Heidegger, in this book, is a little like the butler. He comes on and off at the beginning and end of every chapter, he is obviously crucial although he does not stand, and he probably did it” (Brennan 1993, 17). There are many who would be happy to agree that Heidegger did it; the problem is in figuring out just what it is. For Teresa Brennan, it involved undermining all assumptions that the subject is the starting point of ontology, which is also the assumption that the place occupied by the subject in the space of the world is what gives it this privileged position. This is the metaphysical thinking that Heidegger sought to overturn. But Brennan will insist it also involved far too much in the way of ontology, meaning that it happened on a level of abstraction that was not good. This is not to say that it is bad, but rather that Heidegger’s investigation of the question of the meaning of Being is so abstract that the conclusions which follow from it “might lead anywhere.” When Brennan makes this particular claim she does so in a vaguely threatening way which, along with a footnote citing Lacoue-Labarthe, suggests that that anywhere might very well be a distinctly bad somewhere.
She puts the same point more explicitly in *Exhausting Modernity*:

[Heidegger] reads [the Anaximander fragment] in terms of how Being, as presence, requires withdrawal. In this, he is looking for a sphere beyond either a mechanistic understanding of nature on the one hand, or metaphysics on the other. But he looks for this sphere in the abstract, as do all who follow the flight from the flesh into metaphor. (Brennan 2000, 17n3)

Brennan discerns in Heidegger a thinker who shares her concern with nature and technology; she adds to that concern a Lacanian reading of the ego and a Lacan-inflected Marxist reading of the rise of capitalism, and then returns to the question of nature and technology in a way far more concrete than Heidegger ever could. Following another trajectory, she appreciates the ungroundedness of the subject, and acknowledges that it specifically demands an interrogation of what grounds our psychic life, that is, the foundational fantasy.

The choice of terms is deliberate and idiosyncratic, and it is what must structure the re-reading of Heidegger. I will argue that the discussion of the foundational fantasy in fact leads us away from the thought of foundation to the thought of origin, and it also makes us confront Dasein’s spatiality specifically as embodiment. Together, questions of origin and of bodies direct us to a new reading of “generation,” where the term is understood not just as a discrete stratum in the historical life of a people—as Heidegger would have it in *Being and Time*—but also as the very fleshy process of generation that is never far from Brennan’s thoughts. It must be both/and. If we neglect the thought of generation from *Being and Time* (or something like it) we lose historical consciousness; if we neglect the process of generation, we find that we certainly are conscious of history, but only in abstract terms. In fact, it must be both/and because it cannot be either/or. After all, generations are generated. The problem for Heidegger, it would seem, is that he could think only half that thought.

This is not unlike the familiar criticism of Heidegger that he neglected the ontic in favor of the ontological, a critique so familiar that it seems hardly worth making any more. The difference here is that reading Heidegger after Brennan gives the point a finer focus and is thus far more useful than any broad rejection of ontology. It is a focus produced by the intersection of her concern 1) with the foundational fantasy as the foundation of the ego; 2) with the relation of that fantasy to technological development not to mention the rise of capitalism and imperialist expansion; and 3) with the role of the mother in the fantasy. Brennan’s work, indebted as it is to Heidegger’s rejection of metaphysical thinking, again makes the common point that the turn away from that mode of thought must eventually take into account the circumstances of our fleshy being-with-others-in-the-world. What is distinctly uncommon is the material her work provides for thinking this through.

I’ll begin with a brief account of Heidegger’s thought of generation and Brennan’s argument (from *History after Lacan*) regarding the foundational fantasy. The problem Brennan delineates is addressed in certain re-readings of Heidegger’s work, readings that lead us back to the thought of generation but in a way that delivers us not to a foundation but to an origin, which is to say, to a way of thinking that keeps Brennan’s concerns alive and her thought in motion.

**Heidegger on Generation**

By Section 74 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger has already devoted a great deal of energy to doing those things for which Brennan praises him. He has been working to displace the subject as the central figure in our way of thinking, replacing it with Da-sein, being-there. He has begun to take apart the metaphysical thinking that later, in “The Question Concerning Technology,” will bear the blame for our tendency to conceive ourselves over against nature, which in turn allows us to insist on our rightful domination of nature. He has also done a great deal of work on Dasein’s temporality, but I would not agree that this is simply at the expense of its spatiality. After all, Dasein is Da, there; that particular spatial designation is utterly central to it. In addition, Heidegger’s aim here is to set aside the standing metaphysical dichotomy of space and time and to show Dasein’s being to be temporal being-in-the-world.

The fact that Dasein’s being is being-in-the-world and the acknowledgement that this entails being-with-others together make clear Dasein’s historicity as it is set out in Section 74. Heidegger has already analyzed Dasein’s temporality in terms of anticipation and resoluteness in the face of what is to come in terms of the future. He has also made the claim that, contrary to common understanding, historicity must in turn be thought of not just in terms of the past and “having been” but also in terms of the present and the future. How does historicity operate? He writes:

If fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists existentially in Being-with-Others, its historicizing is a co-historicizing and is determinant for it as destiny. . . . Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual faces, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several subjects. . . . Dasein’s full destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historicizing of Dasein. (H 384)

Let me retrace this trajectory. Dasein’s temporality is futural because of human finitude; our mode of being is Being-towards-death. Once we grasp this we become capable of authentic, resolute being. Throughout *Being and
ime, this grasping has been presented as a being towards one’s ownmost possibility. The death towards which I am is my own death, and no one can see over that death for me. What is added with the thought of historicity is the acknowledgement that my Being-in-the-world is a being-with-others, that being-with-others is experienced as authentic historicity when it is experienced as part of a generation.

But human finitude has as much to do with the fact of our having been born, and thus also our capacity to beget and give birth, as it has to do with death. We are natal and reproductive, as well as mortal beings, and this is also granted, obliquely and reluctantly, by Heidegger’s mention of generation here. What is significant is not only that I die, but that I am followed by others, not only that we will all die but that this generation will be succeeded by another.

Theodore Kisiel, one of the few Heidegger scholars to study this issue, insists that at no point is this a thought of biological generation. Rather, he argues, what Heidegger has in mind (as he indicates in a footnote in Being and Time) is Dichter’s definition of a generation as a group of near contemporaries who by undergoing together the great questions and changes of their day, form a bond and a group that maintains heterogeneity while uniting its members. “Eine Schule” is the term he uses (Kisiel 2001, 90), and the example he supplies is the generation of Novalis, Schleiermacher, Holderlin and Hegel, the second generation of the German Enlightenment. The great event that would have bound them might have been the French Revolution, and the phenomena of Napoleon and his campaigns, just as the event that formed his generation of Heidegger, Scheler, and Juenger was the experience of the first World War. Kisiel first sees Heidegger in those post-war years reflecting in the meaning of generation and the process by which a generation follows in another. The initial concern, he argues, seems to have been anything but abstract. Rather, Heidegger saw the way things stood with a student body that included a great number of men who had been in the trenches. He saw their 

Heidegger is not wholly or not always, given over to sheer abstraction. Yet, along with this concrete concern comes a troublesome distinction that allows Kisiel to conclude that “the real ‘ontological place’ of a generation is thus socio-historical life and not, as sociologist August Comte would have it, biological life” (Kisiel 2001, 91). This is the sort of claim that Teresa Brennan would relish taking apart. It is no longer as simple as a flight from the flesh into abstraction, but rather a failure to understand that the flesh is a social, political, historical, biological, psychological phenomenon.

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Foundations and Fantasy

In Exhausting Modernity, Brennan acknowledges that her treatment of the foundational fantasy has its place in the post-Heideggerian conversation. Heidegger’s critique of foundationalism set her thinking under way, and she makes clear her understanding of that critique:

Everything criticized under the rubric of ‘foundationalism’ depends on the assumption that the human being is the privileged origin of meaning, intelligence and truth. This is why I have borrowed the term ‘foundational’ to describe the fantasy. But I stress that using the term foundational does not mean that there are no ‘foundations.’ (Brennan 2000, 14)

That is to say, “foundational fantasy” is a term that Brennan understands as allowing her to reject the claim that the autonomous human subject is the source of meaning but to posit (not to say postulate) a natural, generative foundation that sustains life and is itself capable of granting meaning. It is clear how Heidegger’s thought could set such thinking in motion despite readings that drive a wedge between the ontic and the ontological. But it is not clear that it could sustain it given the abyss, the ungrounded ground, that Heidegger encounters once he opens the question of the meaning of Being.

It is in History After Locarn that Brennan sets out her thesis, clearly and most forcefully. There is, she argues, a fantasy by which the subject founds itself, and it requires turning its environment into an object. That is to say, following Melanie Klein, that the mother’s body is transformed into an object. The subject goes on to imagine itself as “energetically contained,” a discrete being essentially distinct from its environment for whom, therefore, the experience of an energetic connection to its environment is foreclosed. It also goes on to fantasize the domination/control/dismemberment of the objectified environment/maternal body.

In the course of time, technology has created the opportunity for the foundational fantasy to take hold on a global scale, and this is where Heidegger makes one of his butler-style appearances. He describes the problem at the heart of the phenomenon of technological domination of nature as the metaphysical mindset, a mode of thinking that always regards the subject and its relation to its present space as primary. That makes possible the gross exploitation of nature, threatening to convert it all, famously, into a standing reserve. Brennan quotes Heidegger approvingly, adding only that it is a mindset better described as foundational. By privileging space over time, the metaphysical/foundational mindset allows the subject to conceive itself as its own creator, as giving birth to itself, and to thereby repress consciousness of history and the historical process.
Brennan goes on to argue that the foundational fantasy itself requires a foundation before the foundation, one that is conceived in non-subjective terms: "The foundational fantasy is not fantastic because there is no foundation. It is fantastic because of the illusory foundations it structures and proceeds to make material, which overlie the natural generative foundation with which it competes" (Brennan 1993, 16). Heidegger now appears again as Brennan wonders whether or not he rules out all foundations, even non-subjective ones. Probably not, she says, but cuts short the speculation with the comment, by now familiar, that his work is too abstract in any case. This is the force of the probably in her comment that "he probably did it." She asks the most interesting questions, but, like a perspicacious but distracted detective, she doesn't bring the butler in for questioning. The mystery she most cares about has more to do with the sweat and life in the workers' cottages than with the thin air of the drawing room.

It is in the workers' cottages that the technological triumph of the foundational fantasy is deeply, if not always consciously, experienced. Technology under capitalism has found a way to satisfy the desires of the foundational fantasy, but it does so by taking natural substance and energy—raw material and labor in a more conventional, Marxist register—and binding them in commodities at a rate faster than nature can reproduce. The tendency in such a system will always be to constantly expand the territory under its control, hence imperialism and globalization, to speed up the rate of reproduction and to exhaust nature, including ourselves as workers. In the terminology of Heidegger's "Question Concerning Technology," we become a standing reserve, reduced to the mode of being of equipment lying ready to hand. Thus by reading the operation of the fantasy, first described as a foundation for the developing psyche in the mother-child relationship, in the functioning of macro-economic forces, Brennan works to undo any analyses that force a strict distinction between the socio-historical and the biological.

Brennan has described the illusory foundations, structured by the foundational fantasy, as overlying the natural generative foundation, with which the fantasy competes (Brennan 1993, 16). She acknowledges that this description rests on an assumption that living natural reality exists and, more importantly, she agrees that knowledge of it is confused by the fantastic overlay. Indeed, living reality itself becomes confused. She goes on:

I also assume that one result of the social coverage is to make one doubt the existence of an unchanging reality, precisely because connections with that reality are severed and reality is changed. But even if the world becomes an 'as if' fantastic world, it does not follow that this is the only possible world... [It does not mean that the constructed world of fantasies cannot be differentiated in principle from a living reality. (Ibid., 21)]

So while insistent that we reject mere abstraction and return to the material level, Brennan is under no illusion that social constructions can be set aside, giving open access to natural reality, nor is she willing to say that they are so inextricably linked as to be effectively the same. She would not describe the life she wants to examine as socio-politico-historico-psycho-biological. I think she would prefer to think of it as social and political and historical and psychological and biological.

Because Brennan's main concern is making the connection between micro and macro levels and identifying the conditions that make possible alienation and exploitation, it is obvious why she should choose to establish her link to Heidegger through his essay devoted explicitly to technology. Yet if she were to seriously pursue the question of Heidegger's rejection of foundations, a reading of "The Origin of the Work of Art" might prove more fruitful. She sees Heidegger as doing the right thing when he deploys not just the subject but the subject/object distinction, and he is lauded for undermining the metaphysical/foundational mindset by reviving the thought of our temporality. The problem, she concludes, is that in doing so he never reaches to the level of what she calls the generative chain of nature, and so his work misses the mark. Or does it?

Dasein's Spatiality, Dasein's Origin

Having read Brennan, what happens if we return to Heidegger now? There is difficulty in the fact that she has praised and blamed him for what appears to be the same thing, or at least sides of the same coin—his shift from a metaphysical concern with spatiality to a concern with temporality on the one hand and his flight from the flesh and the level of the concrete and material world on the other. After all, Dasein's concreteness must be its spatiality. Early in Being and Time, Heidegger does seem to ward off any such interpretation, saying: "Dasein's spatiality is not to be thought in terms of its bodily nature, founded in turn on corporeality" (H 89). This, on first reading, seems to mean that Dasein is disembodied and indeed that Dasein may not be thought of as embodied; but I do not think this is the case. What Heidegger rejects here is the dichotomy that sets corporeality in opposition to spirituality. Later, in S. 70, he writes: "[Dasein] is by no means just present-at-hand in a bit of space which its body fills up" (H 368). Does this not mean that we may not think of an embodied Dasein? Again, I think not. What Heidegger rejects here is the thought of Dasein's body as something that takes up space in the world the way a piece of equipment or a lump of earth might. Rather, he says, rejecting the old Cartesian model, our bodies are "spatial in a way which remains essentially impossible for any extended corporeal thing" (Ibid.).
These are still only indications of what Dasein's spatiality is not. When it comes to a positive designation, the best we can find is this: "Dasein can be spatial only as care, in the sense of existing as factically falling" (H 368). It would take a work far longer than this present essay to give all the content of this sentence its due; so it must suffice to read it three times here. First, reading with Jean-Luc Nancy, the sentence's reference to falling suggests turning to the concept of origin that appears in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and in the use of originarity in Being and Time. In a move which could be described as a shift from fundamental ontology to originary ontology, Nancy investigates the origin of Dasein. Second, following Peg Birmingham's Arendtian reading, we see that Dasein's raumlichkeit or spatiality is indeed its embodiment, but not simply or merely so. Third, reading with David Wood, it becomes clear that Dasein's fallen-ness is a falling; that is to say, Dasein is the sort of being that is subject to change and transformation.

At the opening of "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger writes: "Origin here means that from which and by which something is what it is and as it is" (Heidegger 1993a, 143). Brennan, Nancy and Heidegger all make use of the terminology of origin and of foundation or fundament. We have seen Brennan describe foundationalism as the insistence that the human being is the origin of meaning; Nancy writes that originarity is at the foundation of Being (Nancy 2000, 12); Heidegger points out that his fundamental ontology must also be originary (H 232). The relationship between the two registers and the two ways of thinking is complex and varies greatly in the works of these three writers. But, crudely put, foundation has the character of a monolithic substratum that has been completed and upon which a superstructure rests, while origin retains connotations of an active, generative source that, at least in Nancy's analysis, necessarily plural.

In Being Singular Plural, Nancy's concern is with (paraphrasing Heidegger) that from which and by which we are what we are and as we are. This is an ontology, and the language is the sort of abstract Heidegger-ese that Brennan despised; but it is also the case that Nancy's "ontological attestations" all emerge from reflection on common events. For instance, he describes the way we look into a new baby's face to see who she looks like, or how we recognize someone in a snapshot; what we experience in such moments is "the passage of other origins of the world" (Nancy 2000, 9). It is not that there are many origins, or that the origin is shattered or divided, but rather that it is shared and shared out among all beings. He writes:

We have access to the truth of the origin as many times as we are in one another's presence and in the presence of the rest of beings... It is never a question of full access, access to the whole of the origin. Origin does not signify that from which the world comes, but rather the coming of each presence of the world, each time singular. (Ibid., 13–15)

Such thought of origin avoids foundationalism as Brennan defines it by virtue of identifying the source of meaning in beings and in each being, not in the human being. That is to say, the source of meaning must be singular and plural too; Dasein (being-there) is co-originary with Mittle (being-with). Yet the formulation of this thought that resonates most clearly with Brennan's work, reminding us of her intersubjective economy of energy, through exploring the mere intersubjectivity of it, uses the language of circulation:

There is no other meaning than the meaning of circulation. But this circulation goes in all directions at once, in all the directions of all the space-times opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all entities, everything past and future, alive dead, inanimate stones, plants, hills, gods—and "humans," that is, those who expose sharing and circulation as such by saying "we," by saying we to themselves in all possible senses of that expression, and by saying we for the totality of all being. (Ibid., 3)

There is no place here for the monolithic foundation, but there is scope for developing what is a deeply Heideggerian thought in the direction of the thought, so characteristic of Brennan's ontology, of beings who come to be and exist with and between.

The sentence, "Dasein can be spatial only as care, in the sense of existing as factically falling" (H 368), reminds us that we emerge into a world made up of and by others. Arendt puts it most pointedly when she insists, in The Human Condition, on the significance of birth. When we read the sentence for the second time we are reminded that we come into the world from another being in the most material, fleshy way imaginable, and our being here is necessarily being-with. Arendt goes on to work very hard to set aside the fleshy-ness of this fact and to deal instead in terms of a second nature that is indicated by this first nature, which is her attempt to set the political and the historical apart from the biological and the social. It goes on to produce deep problems for her political project. However, in her essay "Heidegger and Arendt: The Birth of Political Action and Speech," Birmingham takes up Arendt's concerns pointing out that there are resources in Being and Time that Arendt neglected, resources that would help overcome the split. After all, Dasein's being-spatial is experienced as embodiment; she goes on to indicate the sense in which Dasein is always at a distance from itself as embodied. This is the force of Dasein's fallen-ness, and it is the indication that this is something other than mere biology. Dasein is always in relation to itself. It is never self-identical and is never at one with its own material being in the way that any mere present-at-hand being is. Heidegger's term is Entfernung, Dasein's
De-severence, its proximity to and distance from itself that never reaches the state of accomplished self-identity.

David Wood, in his essay “Reading Heidegger Responsibly: Glimpses of Being in Dasein’s Development,” pursues his characteristic concern with temporality towards the thought that we are beings who pass through stages of development. After all, falling must also involve movement and change. Our being embodied is our being subject to change and transformation and this is the spatial-temporal fact of our finitude. We are not finite in any simple way in the sense that we do not come to be and pass away without undergoing deep transformations in between. Wood argues that, on the basis of Dasein’s temporality, one can make the case for the transcendent significance of childhood and human development. In fact, he believes that thinking about development can allow us to “illuminate many of the claims Heidegger wants to make, and... [that] this developmental perspective gives Heidegger’s thinking a new future” (Wood 2002, 225).

The specific Heideggerian claims Wood works to shed light on include the thought that philosophy is born from the pain of transition and renewal, that individual development has some of the same kinds of traumatic transformations that we find in human history, and that our own memories show us the difficulty of access to the past.

Here we begin to find ourselves in Brennan territory. According to Wood, all of this moves to a point already a commonplace in psychoanalysis: “That structural transformations are inherent in human development, that humans are essentially developmental creatures, and that these developments are incomplete” (Wood 2002, 229). If we add the thought of generation here, and the fact that we arrive into the world from our mothers, we begin to understand that Dasein’s fallen-ness is an experience permeated by loss. This is what gives us the intimation (and here I paraphrase Wood responding to Derrida remarking on Lacan) that transitions are potentially abyssal; this is why we experience them as angst; this is how they give us a lived experience of extinction and indeed death. Wood concludes that “human development is a fundamentally incomplete ontological journey” (ibid., 232). This is the thought that should serve to unfound any foundational fantasy, and it has its origin precisely in Dasein’s embodied, temporal being.

The point where these readings can be drawn together—Dasein as inevitably, originary with others, as non-identical with itself as worldly, as subject to transformation—is, finally, the thought of generation. Brennan is right; the thought never quite manages to grant access to a foundation on the level of generative nature. This is because Heidegger would indeed reject all thought of foundation, preferring, in its stead, the thought of origin, a lively, generative, singular, plural origin that may turn out to be capable of addressing many of Brennan’s concerns without fading away into mere abstraction.

Conclusion

My speculation here has been that if Brennan questioned the butler, she might find out that he did more, though perhaps in an obscure sort of way than either the detective or the butler himself realized. One of Brennan’s most valuable achievements is in drawing the connection between the subject’s way of being—that is, the foundational fantasy—and modern patterns of domination. Heidegger can certainly be described as having done that, but not in the same way. He set aside the mode of thinking built in terms of foundation and superstructure, a scheme deeply unsuited to the analysis of the beings we are and itself implicated in those patterns of domination. He displaced the subject and subject-centred spatiality, and then reintroduced spatiality as Dasein’s de-severed embodiment. The fact that Dasein is Being-in-the-world and is rational means that it is never removed from others or from the world in the way that the subject—the product of the foundational fantasy—conceives itself to be. At the same time, the fact that Dasein is an embodied being-there, that it is temporal as well as spatial, means that its being is inevitably subject to changes that are all potentially abyssal and ungrounding. Finally, all of this comes together in the sort of social, biological, historical, political, psychological re-reading of Heidegger’s thought of generation that I have gestured towards here—a reading that will be complex, and difficult to make clear, but one that becomes our task after Brennan.

Notes

1. References to Being and Time are to the translation listed below, and take the form (H 123), using the page numbers of the German Meiner edition listed in the margins of the translation.
2. This foreshadows the Rekawasrde of 1933 and Heidegger’s most intimate connection with Nazism.
3. Original here translates ursprunglieh, which is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as primordial.

References

Repressed Knowledge and the Transmission of Affect

Susan James

I last saw Teresa Brennan when she passed through England in the summer of 2002 on her way to Israel, where she was planning to join a group of academics visiting the West Bank. As things turned out, she set off on the next stage of her journey via Egypt, and was surprised and somewhat crestfallen when even her formidable powers of persuasion failed to move the Egyptian authorities to allow her to fly from Alexandria to Tel Aviv. So she never got to Israel after all. But before that adventure, she and her daughter Sangi made a trip from London to stay with us in Cambridge. Teresa arrived in good spirits, ready to drink champagne and talk at length. Among the many subjects we discussed during that twenty-four hours, so poignantly precious in retrospect, was the book she was just finishing, The Transmission of Affect (2004). Conceived as part of an encompassing critique of contemporary western societies, and designed to reveal the interconnections between their biological, economic, psychological and political failings, this volume belonged to a trilogy aimed, in a way, to out-Marx Marx. It was completed shortly before Teresa died and weaves together several of the most resonant themes of her life and work. Reflecting on it is a way of remembering her, celebrating her, and mourning her loss.

The transmission of affect is a problem that troubled Teresa in her every day life. She was, I think, exceptionally sensitive to ambient affects, sometimes suddenly exhilarated by the feel of a conversation, sometimes deeply dismayed by the atmosphere of a room. There were times when these feelings so overwhelmed her that she became deaf to other cues, to the conversations around her, to ordinary courtesies like, "Would you like some more salad?" and so on. She also used to worry about such feelings. Were they straightforwardly hers? If they came from other people, was she interpreting them