PHI 600- Plato's Political Pathology  S. Brill
**Tuesday 2:30-5:30**
**Topic:** Ancient Philosophy

**Description:**
Plato's critical appropriation of medical concepts proves decisive for both his speculative inquiry into political excellence and his critique of particular politeiai (especially his own). This course will examine the influence of Hippocratic medicine on Plato's thinking about the relationship between philosophy and politics. We will focus on Plato's Republic and a selection of texts from the Hippocratic corpus, including "On Techne" "Airs, Waters, Places" "On the Sacred Disease" and "Prognostic."

PHI 602-Modern Philosophy  J. Edwards
**Wednesday 5:30-8:30**
**Topic:** Critique of Pure Reason

**Description:**
First, an overview of the systematic structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Next, a brief account of the historical presuppositions and the overall development of Kant's transcendental theory up to the *Opus postumum*. Thereafter, the close reading of selected texts from the Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. The following topics will receive special attention: (i) Kant’s theory of space and time; (ii) the 1787 transcendental deduction of the categories; (iii) the paralogisms of pure reason; (iv) the ideal of pure reason (especially Kant’s criticism of the ontological proof); and (v) the necessity of transcendental illusion and the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason. In the course of our discussion of these topics, we’ll attempt to explicate in some detail the significance of Kant’s references to his historical predecessors.


PHI 619-Special Topics in Interface Studies  W. Chattick
**Tuesday 6:30-9:30**
**Topic:** Notions of the Soul in Islamic Philosophy

**Description:**
By Islamic philosophy, I mean a tradition of thought that traces its origins back to the Greeks and has been highly influential in the Islamic world down until recent times. If Islamic means anything more than that this is philosophy, but as cultivated within a specific civilization, it can signify that this specific tradition has tended to focus on the two basic themes of Islamic theology, namely the unity of reality and the destiny of the human soul. The prominence of these themes in other approaches to learning meant that by the eleventh century, it is difficult to say who deserves to be called a philosopher, who a theologian, and who a mystic (leading to endless debates in the secondary literature). The seminar will address the concept of the soul/self/psyche as explicated in philosophy broadly conceived. We will read selected passages from figures like Avicenna, al-Ghazali, Afdal al-Din Kashani, Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, and Ibn al-Arabi and discuss their ideas. Participants will write regular essays responding to the philosophical arguments offered by the authors.
Arendt wrote that genocide is the crime of assuming the right to decide with whom we will share the world. Yet she also insisted on our freedom to choose whom to love and with whom to share the most intimate parts of our lives. In this seminar we will examine how this thinker occupied a variety of spaces and thought about how we exist and act in various realms: the political and the social, academia and the public, the oikos and the agora, past and future.

Books to Buy
_____.*The Human Condition* 1998 University of Chicago Press
_____.*Eichmann in Jerusalem* 2006 Penguin

Judith Butler *Parting Ways* 2012 Columbia University Press

Other readings (which will be available on BlackBoard)
“The Crisis in Education”
“Reflections on Little Rock”
Excerpt from *On Revolution*

We live in a world characterized by extreme inequalities and widespread human suffering and deprivation. How should we understand and respond to these facts? This course examines the ethical questions that arise in attempts to diagnose and respond to deprivation on a global scale. It draws on both theoretical and empirical sources. The course focuses on the following questions:

1) What types of obligations, if any, do people in rich countries have to respond to the deprivation of poor countries? What types of obligations, if any, do people in poor countries have to the people of rich countries as part of the legacy of development assistance?

2) Is the central moral problem a problem of unmet basic needs or inequality? What are the practical consequences of focusing on deprivation rather than inequality and vice-versa?

3) Is it possible to develop a definition of deprivation that is cross-culturally applicable?

4) What theoretical tools do we need to adequately understand and respond to the fact that deprivation is feminized?

5) Does development assistance succeed in improving the lives of deprived people? Why or why not? What, if anything, does this imply about normative theorizing about global justice?
Virtually everyone admits (albeit sometimes reluctantly) that Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is one of the most influential philosophical works from the 20th century. Beyond this, however, there is widespread disagreement about almost everything. How is this complex, neologically German, unfinished masterpiece to be interpreted? To what extent is the Heidegger of 1924-27 a phenomenologist? An existentialist? A transcendental philosopher? A hermeneutic one? Should we read him backwards, through the eyes of Derrida and the postmodernists? Is *Being and Time* best consulted for its non-traditional conception of human existence, useful today for making headway with traditional philosophical problems of realism, skepticism, other minds, theory vs. practice, science vs. lifeworld experience? What are the ontological, epistemological, cultural, and socio-political consequences of his general view? Or is the taint of externalism in all of these questions a sign that we have strayed too far away from a faithful treatment of Heidegger’s own stated purpose, where summary, paraphrase, and cautious extensions of the master’s pronouncements take precedence over all such extra-Heideggerian evaluations of his contributions to The Field?

Questions like this may occasionally arise in this seminar, but its primary emphasis will lie elsewhere. An intensive study of substantial portions of Heidegger’s text (the Macquarrie & Robinson translation) will focus on the fact that in the book he left us, he never actually raises the being-question, as he says he ultimately intends. Instead, he stops with an interpretation Dasein in terms of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), which he says “prepares the ground” for thinking about the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being generally. The question, then, is how does *Being and Time* supposedly “prepare” philosophers for raising the being-question (or anything else)? Or, as Heidegger expresses it in several works leading up to *Being and Time*, how are we to understand “being” a philosopher? Keeping this question in focus will encourage consideration of some topics that are often neglected—for example, the idea of Division Two as a hermeneutical repetition of Division One (§§43, 63, 66) and the crucial relation between temporality and historicity (especially §§5-6, and §§72-77).