NATIVES MAKING NATION

Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes

EDITED BY
Andrew Canessa

The University of Arizona Press
Tucson
Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds

The Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s–1940s

Brooke Larson

For a good while now, feminist scholars have illuminated the complicated gendered processes that accompanied modern state-building and development policies in twentieth-century Latin America. Just as modernizing a European nation's devised social policies to cope with an emerging mass society pressing new political claims and bringing social ills into close proximity of urban educated elites, so too did Latin America's liberal and populist states develop educational, immigration, and eugenic plans to manage their explosive demographic, social, and political problems associated with all the opportunities and ills of modernity. In the era of World War I, government reformers drew from biomedical and social ideas articulated in a transnational professional milieu and adapted them to suit their definition of national need or racial heritage. Latin America's varied postcolonial contexts therefore shaped and mediated the political and social significance, and outcome, of those reform efforts in the interwar era. According to Nancy Stepan, Brazil's reformism proved to be the vanguard of tropical medicine policies and sanitation sciences, whereas Argentina cast its fate with the eugenic process of whitening through aggressive immigration policies and military violence against its interior Indian population (1991). The Mexican Revolution, by contrast, made its development policies progressive compared with those of Argentina and Brazil. The revolutionary rupture of its oligarchic liberal state permanently altered the ideological landscape and transformed the national state, making it more beholden to the country's laboring classes and anxious to bring them into the ambit of the populist state. This it largely accomplished through federal agencies of education, agrarian reform, and health under Cárdenas during the 1930s (Stepan 1991; Vaughan 1997).

In the Andes, modernizing and reformist elites confronted a more difficult task. On the one hand, they lacked the institutional or ideological
resources that neighboring nations enjoyed—Chile’s relatively stable political system, Brazil’s biomedical establishment, Argentina’s immigration option, or Mexico’s unifying revolutionary state apparatus—in order to mobilize their own societies for purposes of social control and economic development in an increasingly competitive global economy. On the other, Bolivia’s creole reformers (that is, Spanish-speaking Bolivians of European descent who considered themselves to be progressive nationalists) were deeply preoccupied with the “dead weight” that their own racially heterogeneous, poor, and illiterate populations had placed on their modernizing and culturally homogenizing projects. As they gazed upon their interior landscapes of mountains, provincial potentates, and indians mired in feudal servitude or else erupting in episodic upheaval, creole elites often turned pessimistic about their nation’s racial unfitness or diseased body politic (Arguedas 1909). Anxiety about the future progress of Andean society might then provoke deeper unease about modernity itself. Was Mexico’s postrevolutionary paradigm of mestizaje (that is, racial-cultural fusion) to serve as the Andean template of integration, or did race mixture hasten nineteenth-century “degenerative processes” of racial and republican decline? How might the Andean nation-state uplift and integrate its indigenous populations while preempting a Mexican-styled social revolution? Might Andean scientists and health workers manage to engineer sanitary cities and healthy bodies, purged of disease, alcoholism, and other vices, without the kind of public health campaigns that Brazil boasted? No less urgent, if attempts to attract white European immigration to the Andes were proving to be a colossal failure, how might public education be made to civilize, moralize, and uplift the Andean nations? These questions vexed and divided creole elites (see de la Cadena 2000). Furthermore, as Nancy Stepan notes, tropes of economic and cultural progress could easily be reversed as “degeneration [became] the major metaphor of the day, with vice, crime, immigration, women’s work, and the urban environment variously blamed as its cause” (1991:24). At any historical moment or place, social policy making might be motivated by a fragile calculus of optimism and pessimism, hope and fear—and never more so than in the Andes, where weak states and fractured elites competed with each other over regional/racial projects (as in the polarizing Lima/Cuzco struggle in Peru), or where international conflicts or internal rural uprisings suddenly altered internal political balances (as in Bolivia after the 1899 indigenous uprisings or the Chaco War in the early 1930s).

But sooner or later, modernizing states began to expand the notion

Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds / 33
of “public interest” to encompass realms once thought of as “private.” As the old patriarchal and seigneurial order crumbled, peasants flooded into the cities, and urban laboring groups mounted all sorts of democratizing challenges, Latin America states and social reformers sought new modes of “population management,” which could burrow into the intimate interior of the family. Nationalist ideologies quickly fastened on family, as they did on race, to promote cultural reforms designed to reproduce healthy, efficient, patriotic citizen-workers or peasants. Brazil and Mexico offer striking historical examples of strong corporatist states taking aggressive measures to “rationalize domesticity” in the service of broader political, economic, and eugenic projects. As Mary Kay Vaughan writes, “Public appropriation of reproductive activities such as education, hygiene and health care demanded new interactions between households and the public sphere: [and] the appointed household actor was the woman, the mother” (Vaughan 2000:196). State policies therefore fastened onto gender as both a precept and a tool in their attempts to subordinate popular households to the interests of national development, social order, and patriarchal power (see also Besse 1996; Dore 1997; Dore and Molyneux 2000; Klubock 1998; Mayer 2002; Rosemblatt 2000; Stephenson 1999; Weinstein 1996).

There is no doubt that the new gendered policies had tangible, often beneficial, effects. Public health programs of disease control, the introduction of rural schools, and the regulation of work did improve living standards for certain social sectors and did empower women and children in new ways. But feminist scholarship has shown that the states’ efforts to rationalize the household and, in Eileen Findlay’s words, “impose decency” on the gendered body politic were hardly driven by emancipatory aims (Findlay 1999). On the contrary, progressive social reforms hoped to reconfigure gender inequality during Latin America’s turbulent passage to industrial capitalism and corporatist state building.

This paper explores the Bolivian state’s halting efforts to burrow into the intimate spaces of the rural Aymara world in order to remake indians into productive peasants over the course of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Although the Bolivian state was riddled by partisan and ideological conflicts, and singularly impoverished and ineffectual in comparison to Mexico or Brazil, it managed to mount an extraordinary project of rural education, which ultimately came to target el hogar campesino (variously connoting peasant hearth, household, family) as the terminal point of the state’s evolving “cultural revolution” in the countryside (the term
“cultural revolution,” although most often associated with Maoist reform is, here, borrowed from Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer’s [1985] idea of the slow, contested process by which the modernizing state imposed a normative [hegemonic] order. Rural school reform was aimed at the cultural production of Bolivia’s modern campesino class, but it was not simply about “incorporating indians into the national culture.” It was equally driven by the need to fix racial, class, and gender hierarchies in ways that subordinated the Indian peasantry to the state, especially as rural insurgents pounded on the gates of Bolivian cities in the 1930s and 1940s. Paying close attention to shifting social fields, I examine how the changing calculus of elite needs, aspirations, and fears shaped rural school reform, which became a crucial site for rearticulating gender and race categories in the process of educating campesinos. I am especially interested in how social reformers came to focus rural development policy on the Aymara family and body—where “cultures and habits” stubbornly resided.

Colonial politics of Bolivian rural schooling, of course, lay close to the surface. As historians have vividly shown in the studies on European projects of colonization in Africa, the Bolivian state’s efforts at domestic and bodily reform were highly specific colonial projects springing out of the tensions of westernizing an ethnically plural postcolonial society and designed, at least in part, to “remake memory, tradition, and identity” (Comaroff and Comaroff, citing Bourdieu, 1992:70). La Paz, Bolivia’s young rough-and-tumble capital, was redefining its national function as Bolivia’s major internal metropolis. Its progressive policy makers, agents, and intellectuals set themselves the task of discovering, knowing, uplifting, and managing the rural Aymara world of the altiplano, the highland plateau. Ultimately, the city’s civilizers wanted the erasure of those indigenous communal memories, traditions, and identities, which lay at the core of local Aymara communities, political culture, and mobilizations. Arguing over the racial destiny of the Bolivian nation, creole elites managed to forge a common mandate to bring the Aymara (and the Quechua) population into the ambit of the modernizing Bolivian state. Although by the 1940s some policy makers were increasingly subordinating race doctrines to the fashionable post–World War II discourses of gender and class, this semantic shift barely disguised their most ambitious colonial project to date—the making of a disciplined, gendered peasantry at the margins of modernity.
Around the year 1920, La Paz’s creole elites embarked on a remarkable campaign to remake the Aymara Indian population into the nation’s essential rural labor force. Wrestling with theories of *raza y medio* (race and environment), the capital’s civilizing vanguard rediscovered the “purity” and “authenticity” of Bolivia’s pristine Aymara population, isolated in its mountainous habitat and splendidly adapted to the harsh climate of the altiplano. Beyond the romantic imagery of the pristine Indian and gentle critiques of feudal landlordism, the discovery of the utilitarian and telluric Aymara race had tangible implications. Creole writers fastened on the Aymara population, once the scourge of caste warfare across the altiplano, as the nation’s future rural labor force. The poet, politician, and pedagogue Franz Tamayo, declared in his newspaper column in 1910 that Bolivia’s Indians supplied “ninety percent of the nation’s energy,” because the Indian was born for only one destiny: “to produce, to produce incessantly in whatever form, be it agricultural or mining labor, rustic manufacturing or manual service in urban economy” (Tamayo 1910:64). It was dawning on the liberal vanguard that Bolivia needed to harness the 500,000 Indians who inhabited the altiplano, and who made up almost 25 percent of the nation’s entire population. Indeed, La Paz had already become the colonial metropolis of Bolivia’s campaign to break up remaining aymu lands; advance the edge of rails and latifundismo, and extend the reach of the federal bureaucracy and army into the outlying provinces (Mamani Condori 1991; Rivera Cusicanqui 1986). But by 1920, it was clear that the country’s principal eugenic project, that of white European immigration, was failing badly. Not only was Bolivia failing to inject white blood into its national veins, as Brazil and Argentina were doing, but it could not even promote modern agriculture under its semi-feudal hacienda regime (see Guillén Pinto 1919). Yet agricultural development on the altiplano was crucial if Bolivia was to supply its growing cities with domestic staples and diversify its mineral-skewed economy. The solution? To turn the Aymara peasant into a productive yeoman and artisan. The peasant was to become the rural counterpart, producing for the domestic market, of Bolivia’s strategic mine worker, producing wealth for the export market. No Bolivian writer in the 1920s articulated this goal in quite such stark economic terms; this sort of developmental language would take hold and spread in the late 1930s and 1940s. But Bolivia’s vanguard reformers in the 1910s and 1920s did ap-
preciate the uses of environmental determinism to naturalize the Aymara Indian as the nation’s primordial laborer. They fashioned discourses of raza y medio to accomplish three basic objectives: (1) to identify the “natural aptitudes” of the Indian (hardworking, stoic agro-pastoralists; miners of great strength and endurance; and stoic, disciplined soldiers); (2) to fix the Indian in his “natural habitat” (the isolated high-country of the altiplano, where the air was as pure as the Indian’s blood); and (3) to map his destiny in the nation as the rural laboring force.

These new anthropological truths buttressed the pedagogic turn away from “traditional schools,” which had promoted the older, imported European curriculum based on “mere reading and writing,” “memorization,” “verbalism,” “scholasticism,” and other forms of “intellectualism.” The Liberal Party’s earlier commitment to universal education (based on the teaching of Spanish literacy plus a little scriptural study) came under harsh scrutiny after 1914, just about the time that La Paz’s vanguard rediscovered the authentic Indian and heralded the new (anti-cosmopolitan) spirit of cultural nationalism. Bolivian pedagogues decided around 1920 that they needed to do things their own way, calibrated carefully to Bolivia’s environment, history, and race(s). That turn inward toward a “national pedagogy” produced a crucial prescription that was to govern popular education for the next twenty years. It was the idea that Indians needed a separate system of rural education, geared to their “racial aptitudes” and “natural habitat.” In short, Indians needed special work-training schools (escuelas de trabajo), located in isolated rural settlements far away from the corruption of the city, and staffed by Indian teachers trained in special rural teacher training schools (or, rural normal schools).

In 1919, the Ministry of Instruction issued a comprehensive school reform plan, calling for the reorganization of Bolivia’s pioneering escuelas normales rurales (Umalá, Puna, and Sacaba), teacher training colleges. Government inspections had deemed them to have failed in their mission to create Indian teachers because, among many other shortcomings, they were located in towns and producing “mestizo preceptors” who had refused to teach in rural indigenous primary schools and, worse, had ended up migrating to the cities and meddling in political life (Ministerio de Instrucción Pública 1919:251–56). The new pedagogy would merge rural teacher-training (the rural “normal” school) with the new agricultural work-school so that the two institutions could calibrate their curricula to manual labor training and teaching. The new normal pedagogy would teach three subjects: practical knowledge in agriculture; new methods of
soil preparation; and methods to improve small industries (textiles, ceramics, brick making, hat making, carpentry, and ironwork). Apprenticing in these agro-pastoral and artisan crafts, Indians would learn through “active methods” of education, conducted in the Spanish language. Thus conceived, the process of hispanization (castellanización) would be linked to hands-on knowledge rather than to literacy. In 1919, Minister Daniel Sánchez Bustamante explained that “all school lessons would have one material objective, manual labor, and one moral objective, to instill the value of socially useful labor” (ibid., 163). But the new pedagogy was also driven by an equally powerful concern about stabilizing the racial and spatial location of Aymara people, as they tried to gain access to literacy, knowledge, and mobility. In a revealing 1918 report to the congress, the ministry stated unequivocally that the new work-school was designed to guard against Indians turning into cholas (hispanizing Indians) “to abandon their own domain, by converting themselves into extortionist corregidores or into electoral mobs; [with their newly acquired knowledge], they will know how to exploit the land and . . . they will understand that the modest citizen should function only within the limits of his own sphere” (Ministerio de Instrucción Pública 1918:57–58). These contradictory motives expressed a larger postcolonial dilemma: the ruling elite’s need to promote economic progress (especially the formation of a disciplined rural labor force on the altiplano), while securing the internal borders of race, gender, and class (Stoler 1996). This dilemma would not soon go away, and Bolivia’s progressive reformers constantly felt themselves pulled between the promises of modernity and the imperatives of social order, between economic hope and racial fear.

“The education of the Indian in his medium” thus became the leitmotif of rural school reform in 1920. But it posed another, perhaps deeper, dilemma for La Paz’s colonizing pedagogues: namely, how to simultaneously preserve and alter Indians in their “natural habitat.” This classic dilemma of the (post)colonial civilizer (see Chatterjee 1993; Sider 1987)—to construct and transform racial difference—comes to light in an illuminating 1918 field report, written by two teachers possessed of sharp ethnographic intuition. Mariaca and Peñaranda were director and teacher, respectively, in the rural, teacher-training normal school located in the tiny town of Umalá, on the coast of Lake Titicaca. Already their school was plagued by problems, and it would soon be denounced as a failure by official inspectors. But these teachers used their bitter field experience to critique indigenista orthodoxies about race
environment. (*Indigenismo* refers to the political, literary, and ethnographic production of educated creole elites, who arrogated to themselves the authority to study, diagnose, represent, assimilate, reform, or celebrate the Indian race(s) that inhabited their nation.) Specifically, they criticized indigenista reformers for having failed to draw a conceptual distinction between the Indian's *physical* and *social* environments.

It was true, they argued, that highland Indians needed to be rooted in their "natural" rural domain and instructed in work-schools, so they could take their appointed place in the nation as rural laborers and artisans. But if the rural normal school had to mold indigenous laborers in harmony with their habitat, it had an equally powerful mandate to wrench them from their social milieu, one that was "saturated by prejudices and backward customs, the locus of alcoholism and demoralization" (Mariaca and Peñaranda 1918:11).

Specifically, rural schooling needed to fight against the overpowering tendency of moral regression, once the Indian child left the enlightened sphere of learning and slipped back into the stupefying routines, debauchery, and other vices of village life. For these teachers, poised on the cutting edge of rural school reform yet demoralized by their own field experiences, the new pedagogy had to shift the focus of attention from the physical to the social and moral environment of the population in order to diagnose, and then eradicate, the Indian pupil's "bad habits and customs." Implicitly, the child and the family were set in place as the object, mechanism, and rationale for state intervention, and their bodily habits of hygiene, consumption, clothing, diet, housing, and sexuality would soon be targeted for resocialization.

But how exactly were rural teachers to manage the moralization of their Indian pupils? Unhindered by practical matters, these teachers envisioned a new kind of communitarian, agro-pastoral, normal school for Indians. It would become a beacon radiating productivity and enlightenment into the dark rural hinterlands. This so-called school colony (*la colonia escolar*) was to revolve around the idea of the Indian boarding school (*el internado*), where teachers would be able to inculcate values and monitor routines of everyday life in classrooms, workshops, and fields. The boarding school complex would be housed in vast pavilions, surrounded by cultivated fields and pastures. Not only would "satellite" primary schools channel the most adept Indian pupils to the agro-normal, but the "solar" normal school would become the axis of expanding agro-industrial colonies—attracting parents (*los*...
padres de familia) and other “healthy and hardworking elements” into their cultural orbit.

This brave new world, reminiscent of the totalizing utopian community of work, piety, and civilization under the colonial Jesuit system of reducción was certainly bold. Yet it also borrowed curricular elements (specifically, hygiene, homemaking, and industrial labor) from contemporary North American boarding school models that had been functioning on the western “Indian” frontier of the United States since the late nineteenth century (Szasz 1974). Bolivian educational reformers were also attracted to the North American ideal of segregated “Negro” industrial schooling, as exemplified by Hampton and Tuskegee institutes (see Guillén Pinto 1919, for example). In any event, these Bolivian teacher/reformers obviously struck a chord; for in 1919 Alfredo Guillén Pinto, another young, up-and-coming educational reformer, published a major study extolling the idea of special education (based on rural vocational training) for the Indian races (ibid.). The minister of public instruction was also convinced that Bolivian rural school reform needed to refocus attention on the socialization of indigenous youth in newly established internados, and in 1919, he called on the congress to establish insulated boarding schools so as to promote middle-class values—temperance, thrift, cleanliness, and hard work—and “instill an awareness [in Indians] of what it means to live like a civilized race, capable of continual improvement” (Ministerio de Instrucción Pública 1919:263).

The reformed rural normal schools became rural colonies of productivity, discipline, and acculturation and were thus able to reconcile the contradictory goals of reproducing and transforming the Aymara race without causing any fundamental social disturbance. They set out to lay the conceptual groundwork for the state’s intervention into peasant cultural practices in the 1930s and 1940s—although creole projects of rural school reform in those years were chasing varied, often divergent, political objectives. Both left- and right-wing political regimes in those decades learned to turn the rural Indian school movement to larger political and ideological purposes in specific historical moments. In the 1930s, the Indian boarding school complex, institutionalized as the Indian school nucleus (el núcleo escolar indígena), became a crucial, albeit contested, site for projecting populist, socialist, and syndicalist political projects onto the Bolivian peasantry in the aftermath of the Chaco War (Choque 1996; Pérez 1992). By contrast, as we shall see below, the post-1940 rightist governments used rural Indian school reform to accelerate the cultural
assimilation of indians in a fast-track project of economic development, social control, and cultural mestizaje.

The tentative expansion of the state into the rural communities during the 1920s was accompanied by an explosion of interest in the interior world of the indian. Following in the footsteps of Bautista Saavedra’s classic 1904 ethnography of the ayllu, a new generation of professionals probed even deeper into the ayllu, extracting truths about the nature of Aymara or Quechua family life. José Salmón Ballvian’s “El indio íntimo: Contribución al estudio biológico social del indio” (1926) plunged the reader into the minutiae of everyday rituals of work, consumption, sexual relations, communal ceremony, and political life. We learn, for example, that Aymara couples were nearly “asexual” due to the stupefying effects of coca (a finding that surely provoked the anxiety of reformers eager to promote peasant procreation, rural repopulation, and regional economic recovery). Another pathbreaking study came in the form of a celebrated thesis delivered to Bolivia’s first Teachers’ Congress held in 1930. Published in 1932, María Frontaura Argona’s Towards the Indian Future (Hacia el futuro indio) electrified Bolivia’s emerging leftist and populist vanguard by calling for rural education, civilization, and agrarian reform to forge the indian races into a skilled, propertied peasantry, emancipated from centuries of servitude but living in harmony with Bolivia’s other races and social classes. That a young, unknown woman teacher would crystallize the vanguard position of the new teachers’ union was certainly notable. But Frontaura also tried to refocus the emerging public debate over gender and national identity on the imperatives of her indigenista cause. In a chapter titled “A Psychological Glossary of the Indian Woman,” Frontaura offered a fascinating diagnostic examination of gender, race, and region, by mapping gender across the older geo-environmental-ethnic dichotomy, made famous by Alcides Arguedas (1909), between the “soft” valley culture of the Quechua and the “harsh” highland culture of the Aymara races. Injecting gender into that familiar geo-racial polarity, Frontaura drew an innate distinction between the sweet, sensitive, compliant, civilizable, religious Quechua woman, molded by the gentle valley climate and easier economic prospects, and the hardened Aymara woman who was made, if not of bronze, then of “steel” (36–38). Frontaura’s essential Aymara woman was unique: “Never has nature molded a woman equal to the Aymara... Every muscle fiber is insensitive to pain and exhaustion, as if she were made of compact metal.” “Nowhere in the world is there another woman like her.” “She is constituted purely of
nerve." "Her will power is stronger than that of any other race on earth. When she sets her mind and robust character to accomplish something, she will do it at any cost or sacrifice. Her strength to resist defies all reason" (40–41). What were the determinants of such a singular character? A combination of nature and nurture: gender and race were molded by years of pain, maternal neglect, stoicism, mysticism, and deprivation inherent in the material and cultural milieu of Aymara society.

These early ethnographic incursions into the Aymara family framed a crucial moral issue that would continue to haunt the ethnographic imagination of Bolivian reformers and educators for the next two decades. Both authors alluded to the innate fragility, instability, deprivation, and ultimate dysfunction of the Aymara family. Salmón Ballivián's brief biography of an Indian ritual authority (achurité) was really a meditation on the ways that the ayllu's civil-religious rituals brought financial ruin, fragmentation, and dispersion to the Indian family. Such illogical customs and accumulated debt, he argued, ultimately forced Aymara men to cast off from family and ayllu in search of livelihood, trade, and wage work in distant mines, cities, and haciendas. Meanwhile, their women and children stayed back on the land, eking out a precarious existence in wretched isolation (123–28). María Frontaura, in turn, worried about the destabilizing practices of domestic life, such as Aymara mothers abandoning their young children to go off into the puna (high altitude lands) to pasture their animals or to pursue long-distance trading activities in the cities. Worse yet, Aymara daughters were socialized in ways that encouraged their mobility and absence from the home. For against proper female roles, young preadolescent daughters were sent off into the mountains to pasture sheep, and they sometimes accompanied their fathers on long llama-train treks to mines, markets, or into the fields (42). Although they grew strong and agile from these journeys, Frontaura's Aymara girls continued to suffer isolation, physical abuse, and deprivation in the confines of their own home. Thus, they came to embody a curious contradiction of resistance and resignation, strength and docility—the combustible elements that made up the Aymara "woman of steel." However these writers diagnosed the instability of the Indian family, they concurred that Aymara home life boded ill for the future regeneration of the race and the hope of forging an organic "Bolivian family."

But who exactly was paying attention? Certainly there was a flurry of creole interest in the Indian problem after the 1927 indigenous uprising of Chayanta. Although the epicenter of indigenous unrest was located in
Quechua-speaking communities and on haciendas in the southern highlands, far from La Paz, its repercussions were felt across the northern altiplano. Threats of rebellion in the north plunged the Bolivian congress into intensive debates over the “psychological, economic, and moral causes” of unrest among the nation’s Indian population. And many politicians worried publicly about the growing network of “communist agitators” that were supposedly infiltrating indigenous communities and stirring up trouble (Congreso Nacional de Bolivia 1928:50-80, 134-41, 209-11). Such political talk put pressure on the government to crack down on popular and insurgent forces in both city and countryside during the late 1920s and early 1930s (Klein 1969: chaps. 4 and 5; Rivera Cusicanqui 1986: chap. 2; Manani Condori 1991: chap. 3). The brewing 1927 crisis also spurred reformers to inject a new sense of urgency into the perennial issues of Indian land, labor, and education (see, for example, various newspaper articles and editorials in El País and La Defensa [September and October, 1927]). The deeper structural issues of communal land rights were pushed aside, however, while the government turned to “safer” cultural reforms, such as promoting indigenous school reform. Rhetoric about Indian education was hammered into institutional policy in 1930 and 1931, with the creation of a semi-autonomous Bureau of Indian Education, created to organize and oversee rural primary schools and Indian teacher training (Ministerio de Instrucción Pública 1931).

But it was the Chaco War (1932-1935) more than any other event that suddenly transformed the Indian family from an esoteric subject of anthropologists into a highly publicized national concern. First, because the nation suddenly needed to restore the “Indian [man] to the active life of the nation” (in the headlines of one news article) in order to mobilize him for the defense of the patria, fatherland, against the “barbarian Guarani nation” of Paraguay, and second, because the war itself unleashed all sorts of popular sectors that began to lay claim to citizenship and welfare rights in return for their hardships and sacrifices for the Bolivian nation. The postwar state, driven now by a new “military socialist” order, had to attend to multiple, mobilizing groups of ex-combatants, orphaned children, and widows, whose welfare was suddenly deemed the responsibility of the postwar Bolivian state. In particular, women invaded the public sphere to demand new social reforms. Bolivian feminist scholarship and, more recently, Marcia Stephenson argue that both elite and popular organizations of women catalyzed social reforms that “contested the public-private divide,” brought urban working-class women into the
purview of the populist state, and cast mothers as the new guardians of national peace and reconciliation (Stephenson 1999:24–26; THOA 1994; Medinaceli 1989; Lehm and Rivera Cusicanqui 1988). Most visible to the urban elites were La Paz’s urban market and laboring women, many of them unionized and anarchist cholas, who frequently took to the streets to demand labor legislation, municipal licenses to sell their goods on the streets, and other forms of citizenship rights (Gill 1994; Stephenson, chaps. 1 and 4). In response, the government created a host of new ministries of public health, welfare, and labor to cope with, and contain, this explosion of new social groups clamoring for recognition and reform (Rivera Cusicanqui 1996).

In this political climate, indigenous school reform made important advances (Choque 1996). Under a semi-autonomous state organization, the General Direction of Indian Education, sixteen núcleos escolares flourished as the tangible outcroppings of the earlier imagined school-colonies, once promoted by the Ministry of Instruction and several progressive teachers around 1920. These new community-based “nuclear” schools tried to put into practice, in varied regional contexts, the notion of the integrated and insular Indian boarding work-school complex, designed “to radiate” knowledge and enlightenment to satellite primary schools and their surrounding peasant villages. And as envisaged by the earlier indigenistas, each of these communitarian schools aimed to train and civilize their male and female pupils, as well as the padres de familia who participated in the life and work of the boarding schools. In short, these rural schools were faithful to many of the same separatist principles and methods of teaching that were promoted by the first generation of pedagogic reformers around 1920. In general, the sixteen rural nuclear schools were to mold Aymara and Quechua Indians into virtuous Indian laborers and consumers, stabilized in their own “natural habitat” but wrenched from their “backward” cultural lifeways and reinstalled in these enlightened enclaves.

Yet the wrenching experiences of the Chaco War and the growing radicalization of popular political forces in the mines, cities, and countryside began to alter and polarize the pedagogical objectives of Indian school reform. The núcleos escolares gradually became enclaves of leftist, syndicalist, and nativist ideologies and social actions, or so they were perceived in many political quarters. In 1936 the rural school of Vacas was born in the lap of the local syndicalist movement of peasants; Caquiaviri anchored itself in the volatile Aymara town, famous for its history of upris-
ings; and the famous Indian school experiment in the altiplano town of Warisata became a nucleus of nativism and resistance against feudal-like landowners on its borders. It is true that all of Bolivia’s initial núcleos escolares had to negotiate different relations to local indigenous communities, surrounding regional elites, leftist and syndicalist organizations, and the federal bureaucracy. But as a whole, the Indian School movement of the 1930s represented a potent multiethnic alliance among shifting factions of radical political parties, middle-class teachers and intellectuals, a growing movement of peasant syndicalism, and radicalized indigenous peasant leaders (see esp. Perez 1961; Salazar 1997).

At the local level, these school/communities (made famous by Warisata’s self-designated title of “school-ayllu” [la escuela-ayllu]) were experimental microcosms of interethnic democracies in practice. Communitarian schools promoted the direct participation of indigenous families in the cooperative labor and local governance of the rural school. In various ways, the new rural nuclear schools tried to introduce elements of agro-labor, hygiene, and physical education into their curricula, but those schools were increasingly shaped and mediated by leftist and nativist slogans calling for the “emancipation of the Indian,” “the raising of class awareness,” “the restoration of the ayllu,” “the destruction of the old feudal order,” and/or the “the advancement of citizen rights.” All these official communitarian schools promoted, to a greater or lesser degree, the direct participation of indigenous families in the cooperative labor and local governance of the rural school, and thus they brought the peasant family into the very center of building, debating, and often co-governing the local school. And in the case of Warisata, the boarding school actually became the locus of a reconfigured community. As the 1930s progressed, however, polarizing political forces began to turn these experiments in rural school reform into local battlegrounds over the right of Bolivia’s indigenous people to education and, more fundamentally, to land, citizenship, and social justice in the postwar society.

The year 1940 marked an abrupt end of postwar populism and reform and ushered in a new era of imperialism, repression, and what Josep Barnadas (1976) has called “the feudal reaction.” A new conservative group of reformers seized control of Indian education, redirecting its social purpose and methods toward the linked imperatives of economic modernization, social stability, and counterinsurgency. Once more, only this time with teeth, the state fastened on gender and family, and specifically the peasant household (el hogar campesino) as a strategic point of cultural and political incursion.
Gender, Household, and Family Values

"If Warisata's [old] slogan was 'the community for the school and in the school,' now we can say 'the school [is] at the service of the community and in the peasant home.'" In his speech to the Bolivian congress in 1947, the minister of education used this slogan to synthesize the government's critical pedagogic shift toward issues of gender, family, and the body. The minister explained:

The "Work School," eulogized by Warisata, retains its validity, but now it is directed toward the improvement of the rural family. If the dynamism which once flourished in Warisata were now to be redeployed for the benefit of the peasant household, Bolivia's rural living standards would soar to unimaginable heights; each material conquest would be irreversible and useful. . . . [Thus] the contribution of rural school reform ought to be clear and well-defined: to teach the campesino to take better advantage of his own labor and to concern himself with his standard of living. With proper tools and techniques and with aspirations similar to those of more evolved rural sectors, the man of the countryside will have more possibilities for self-improvement. . . . Furthermore, increased agricultural production will contribute to cheapening [the cost of] living in Bolivian cities which, paradoxically, must feed themselves today with imported products.

The rural school must also concern itself with the health of the campesino, to ensure that our male campesino is imbued with the principles of a healthy life, and that he practices the fundamental [routines] of personal cleanliness, good diet, good housing, and systematic prophylaxis. To achieve such elementary success in the interior of the Indian household is the immediate imperative of the rural school" (Congreso Nacional de Bolivia 1947:131–33; emphasis added).

The ministry's message to the congress was stark: Bolivia's rural development pivoted on the intimate socialization of campesino. The "new" rural work-school was to remake the peasant family—mainly through the resocialization of the male campesino—and harness it to Bolivia's project of agricultural development. Capitalist development of the countryside, feeding the cities, the reproduction of the rural labor force, and the self-sufficiency of the Bolivian economy all depended on forging, and monitoring, the nuclear farm family under the direct influence of federal bureaucrats, schoolteachers, agronomists, and health and social workers.
To accomplish those goals, state agencies would have to destroy, or reverse, the dangerous indigenista school reforms of the 1930s. In fact, the whole ideological thrust of agrarian modernization after 1940 was to repudiate the indigenistas’ aims and methods of Indian school reform during the earlier populist era, and Warisata became the favorite target of attack. The smear campaign began in 1940, marking the government’s abrupt ideological shift toward work and hygiene, family farming, and capitalist rural development. Under the conservative regime of Colonel Enrique Peñaran-da, the Ministry of Education (via the newly formed Consejo Nacional de Educación) launched a massive attack on Bolivia’s original sixteen núcleos escolares for having sowed the seeds of indigenous unrest, destabilized rural communities, neglected the health and welfare of rural families, and deviated from the “biological need” of the nation to create a segmented labor market of healthy productive peasants (Consejo Nacional de Educación 1940). According to the “tribunal of judges” commissioned to evaluate ten years of indigenista school reform, Warisata and the other núcleos escolares had failed to transform indigenous populations into modern agro-pastoralists, letting them practice their “primitive” agricultural methods in communal work projects. More deviously, the communitarian schools had violated the national interest by training indians in artisan skills, awakening new economic aspirations and vocations, thus tempting them to abandon their natural sphere and migrate to the cities. The judges proclaimed “the ultimate goal of the school is the making of great agriculturalists because indians are magnificently adapted to the harsh climate and thus irreplaceable” (ibid., 140). But on the issue of land reform, the new pedagogues equivocated. For example, Vicente Donoso Torres, the architect of pro-development (desarrollista) rural school polices, took a classically evolutionary stance. Agrarian reform, a la Mexico, was needed in Bolivia, but he warned against attacking Bolivia’s “feudal regime of landholding” until the time that indians were “prepared” to enter into new forms of property relations. Better to pass laws improving relations between landlords and laborers, regulating minimal salaries, prohibiting religious fiestas (where the indians revelers consume great quantities of alcohol and coca), and organizing peasant production cooperatives with access to an Agricultural Bank for advances in seeds, tools, machinery, and capital to jump-start agro-pastoral industries (Donoso Torres 1946:180–81). Bolivia’s cultural, political, and economic progress would have to be carefully channeled through school reform, before the peasantry was “readied” to take its place as property owners!
Clearly, the peasantry’s preparation for entry into the modernizing nation as propertied citizens was contingent upon the deep resocialization of the peasant family. To mold the campesino man into Bolivia’s modern (albeit still landless) farmer was one aim; to mold the campesina woman into Bolivia’s hygienic housewife and mother was its essential complement. It was the educational philosopher Vicente Donoso, who had the clarifying word on the gender issue, as well. Writing generally on “the education of the Bolivian woman,” Donoso joined a chorus of social reformers, writers, and labor organizers eager to nationalize motherhood as the womb, nurturer, and healer of the war-torn Bolivian nation (see Gotkowitz 2000; Stephenson 1999, chap. 1). Donoso engendered a transracial discourse on the “aptitudes” and “indispensability” of the woman in building the “Bolivian family” (both real and metaphorical). And he listed the complementarity of gendered traits. Women possess sweetness, patience, thrift, love, and reconciliation; men boasted valor, impulsiveness, profligacy, combative, and intransigence. Such “complementarities,” of course, composed the organic basis of the nuclear family—regardless of geo-racial particularities. Naturalizing womanhood in bourgeois European terms, in vivid contrast to the stoic, strong, combative Aymara woman sketched in Frontaura’s 1932 ethnography, also rationalized the rigid sexual division of labor, sentencing all women (regardless of race, ethnic, or class categories) to “their fundamental responsibility . . ., the organization of the family, basis of the community, the patria, and humanity. On this premise, the education of the woman should prepare her, above all, for the happiness of the home” (Donoso Torres 1946:168). As far as cultivating conjugal bliss in the campesino family, however, Donoso and his colleagues had one primary prescription: hygiene. “The new schoolhouses need supplies of drugs and soap because the educational question, as regarding peasants, must first deal with the extirpation of lice and filth” (Consejo Nacional de Educación 1940:5). Indeed, the lack of hygienic reform had been one of the great sins of the earlier communitarian schools, according to the grand inquisitors of 1940 (ibid., 107). In later years, rural school curricula would move beyond issues of health and hygiene to set up highly ritualized regimes of child rearing, food, fashion, sleeping arrangements, architecture and spatial layouts, and modes of sociability in the interior of the peasant school and family (see Stephenson 1999, chaps. 3 and 4).

In the view of social reformers, the new rural work/hygiene regime of the 1940s responded to Bolivia’s urgent development needs, especially
the need to stabilize the farming family as the nucleus of agro-production/reproduction on the altiplano. But as I have already hinted, it also responded to shifting social anxieties under the converging pressures of rural labor unrest and leftist mobilizations across Bolivia. In fact, I would argue that the overriding issue among reformers in the early 1940s was not the promotion of economic development, but the maintenance of social peace and harmony in the turbulent countryside. Vicente Donoso, himself, feared that Bolivia was on a collision course in the race between development and social revolution: “It is urgent to realize this peaceful evolution before it turns into a social revolution of the masses. It would be fatal for the nation, especially if it followed the path towards world communism, with its simplistic program to cure poverty by dissolving private property, without taking into account human and environmental difference” (Donoso Torres 1946:181). In that Donoso and other creole reformers could not conceive of indigenous men and women as proactive political subjects capable of mobilizing their own people in pursuit of land, labor laws, schools, and citizenship rights, they heaped most blame on leftist parties, rural teachers, and the expelled directors of the communitarian schools. The 1940 council of educators, for example, warned that “under the pretext of educating the Indian in his own ayllu, the [radical indigenistas] have crusaded unjustly and unpatriotically against whites and mestizos, turning countryside against city, and using racist doctrines to wage a dangerous war against national unity” (Consejo Nacional de Educación 1940:105). By the mid-1940s, conservatives thought Bolivia was caught in a spiral of violence and anarchy amid the brief Villarroel regime, the Indian Congress of 1945, the spreading rural sit-down strikes (huelgas de brazos caídos), the Ayopaya peasant uprising of 1947, and the brewing miners' strike in Catavi. One writer warned that “professional political agitators, propagandists with new ideas, and semi-literate lawyers and notaries (the infamous sinterillos) were whipping up the rural Indian masses and plunging Bolivia into a state of internal warfare not seen since the end of the Chaco War” (Jauregui Rosquellas 1947:530–31).

What could save Bolivia from the impending social cataclysm? Nothing less than the rapid biocultural conversion of indians into mestizos! Vicente Donoso put it best: “What we need to do is incorporate the elements of universal civilization into the life of the Indian, to benefit him in his own medium... because the end product of the Bolivian Indian has to be mestizaje” (Donoso Torres 1946:179, emphasis in the original). Furthermore, mestizaje need not wait for biological race mixing to take
effect. The state could regulate de-indianization by *banishing* "ethnic clothing" (*lluchu*, ponchos, short *bayeta* pants, *ojotas*, and *cipeles*), which always stigmatized men as "indians" no matter that they knew how to read and write, or spoke Spanish. This critical redefinition of Bolivia’s racial destiny as mestizo did not deviate radically from earlier indigenista national imaginings, but oligarchic reformers now harnessed it to their other overarching goals—rapid capitalist development of agriculture and rural counterinsurgency. In 1940, the Consejo Nacional de Educación was already formulating Bolivia’s racial project: henceforth "mestizaje would become the ethnic goal of Bolivia, instead of the formation of racial groups with their own languages, devoid of nationalist spirit, and separated [from the rest of the nation] by hateful rivalries and incomprehension" (Consejo Nacional de Educación 1940:137). The gendered nature of rural social policies (hygiene, development, and schooling) would create out of Bolivia’s unruly and heterogeneous populations not only a disciplined and docile peasant class, but a racially purified homogeneity on which a unifying Bolivian “nationhood” ultimately might be erected. All they needed was a strong, well-endowed partner to launch these fundamental reforms.

Enter the United States, with its hemispheric interest in promoting social order, capitalist development, and friendly governments. Bolivia, of course, was strategic to the United States because it lay at the geopolitical core of South America, and also because its oil and tin were desperately needed in the war effort. Of course, Washington envisioned a much broader imperial project springing out of urgent geopolitics of the Second World War. It needed to secure the hemisphere against the twin threats of fascism and totalitarianism, and in the early 1940s FDR turned his Good Neighbor Policy precisely to those ends. Under the newly formed Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the U.S. government sought new ways to insert itself into the interior of Latin American societies by promoting education, development, and health programs. An official 1955 report explained the original rationale behind the first bilateral aid program in Bolivia, established in the mid-1940s:

The urgency of the times brought an awareness that the economic condition of individual countries is important to the stability of the hemisphere, and the United States consequently offered to go in as a partner ... in projects for raising the standard of living. The resulting cooperative programs being grassroots affairs, with immediate
advantages to people and to communities, were successful in their own technical right, and have survived and greatly influenced political thinking. (SCIDE 1955:8)

It was this last objective, to sway political thinking, that immediately concerned the U.S. embassy in La Paz. In 1945, at the height of political turbulence and unrest, the embassy dispatched weekly reports on the dangers of indigenous discontent and insurgency, the spread of labor strikes, and the growing communist menace (United States Record Administration, 1945). It urged Washington to increase its institutional and ideological presence in Bolivia, by deploying the new Inter-American Cooperative Education Service (SCIDE) to spread American values and goodwill. Under its first director, the U.S. rural educator Ernest Maes, SCIDE put most emphasis on rural Indian education and health care. By all accounts, U.S. development aid was beginning to assume political significance as an arm of counterinsurgency.

More significantly, SCIDE's crusade to bring western aid, culture, and ideology to rural Bolivia took its technicians directly into the domestic sphere of the rural campesino household. SCIDE's 1948 Teacher's Manual mapped the technician's pathway into el hogar campesino: the first objective, it explained, was "to form in the campesino good living habits with respect to diet, dress, house, personal health, and civic, social and religious practices." The next three objectives had to do with agro-pastoral education, followed finally by the goal of socializing peasants to become good family and community members, as well as socially useful citizens. In short, SCIDE organized the rural curriculum around two primary subjects—agricultural education and sanitary education (Ministerio de Educación 1948; Nelson, 1949:21). Its priorities matched those of the Consejo Nacional de Educación. But SCIDE's program specifically promoted the use of peasant women as conduits for the realization of economic and cultural progress. For if Bolivia was to spread "good living habits," it needed to fix the peasant woman in her own specific "natural habitat"—the nuclear family. Although Bolivian reformers themselves had recognized el hogar campesino as a crucial locus of cultural colonization, they had generally targeted the male campesino as the contact point. Just as most creole men could not conceive of indigenous people as active political subjects, so too they rendered the campesina as a subordinate, almost invisible, subject within the peasant patriarchal household.

Now, however, SCIDE's technicians publicly authorized rural women
as agents of eugenic improvement and cultural change. Yet their blueprints for domestic and gender reform also revealed a profoundly ambivalent stance toward patriarchal power. On the one hand, SCIDE professionals reported that “the most inaccessible group in the average community is the adult women,” and that Indian girls rarely attended school because of their traditional jobs in the home and tending sheep (SCIDE 1955:41). SCIDE had encouraged campesina girls to step forward and enter primary schools, and in 1955 reported that “a really signal achievement for the normal school [of Warisata] is that the Amautas [communal authorities] have taken an interest in the home life instruction and more of them are sending their daughters to school.” Another experimental SCIDE school in the old núcleo escolar of Kalaque reported that female attendance had grown from 9 to 14 percent in its nineteen rural schools during the late 1940s and early 1950s (ibid.: 41, 42). On the other hand, SCIDE’s social education programs reinforced or, borrowing from Vaughan (2000), “modernized,” the institution of patriarchy, by trying to domesticate the wild and feisty Aymara woman into an ideal middle-class housewife. And we all know where delusions of domesticity can lead! The 1948 Rural Teacher’s Manual is a hilarious guide to “domestic economy” worthy of Doctor Spock and Martha Stewart, 1940s-style. It maps out in copious detail the practical knowledge that rural Andean teachers should convey to their female students—everything from infant care, food preparation, home remedies, and vitamin supplements to techniques of ironing, setting the proper table, pretty color coordinations, and choosing sewing patterns flattering to the slim figure (Ministerio de Educación 1948)! Funny, absurd, and seemingly trivial, these blueprints of cultural reform nevertheless reveal the extent to which the Bolivian state, now in alliance with U.S. aid workers, was trying to infiltrate the indigenous family, reorganize gender, assimilate Indians into a homogenous national culture, and forge a rural working class.

In the post–World War II climate of optimism, the United States obviously had set itself a utopian task, encouraged as it was by the paternal sentiments and social anxieties of Bolivian statesmen and intellectuals. Ten years later, SCIDE noted its considerable achievements in rural education, hygiene, and development in the six núcleos escolares campesinos under its control. But overall Bolivia’s first bilateral aid project had made barely a dent in rural Indian illiteracy (estimated at around 85 percent in 1955); it had failed to spread “technical education” to most of the nation’s 700 rural schools; and, more fundamentally, it had even failed
of forestall social revolution (SCIDE 1955:14–15). Rural unrest began escalating in the late 1940s, and it culminated in a series of coordinated political actions among dissident factions of the peasantry, miners, and middle class in 1952. Yet SCIDE weathered those storms. Slowly, patiently it laid the ideological foundation of a new cycle of rural school reform, to be carried out by a new political vanguard in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution. It fell to the postrevolutionary populist state to carry forth SCIDE’s project of rural school reform in the mid-1950s on the road to modern mestizaje, patriarchy, and the formation of a modern rural labor force.

**Conclusions**

Borrowing conceptual elements from Foucault and Bourdieu, anthropologists Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff have studied how, in the colonization of South Africa, the imposition of new bodily routines and moral regimes represented the most intimate and penetrating forms of imperial power and social control that accompanied the expansion of capitalism and British colonial rule. Studying the work of missionaries among the Tshidi people, the Comaroffs show how the agents of empire tried to transform native memories, traditions, and identities into individuated and bounded selves, upon whose bodies were to be inscribed new categories, values, and identities that added up, ideally, to docile colonial subjects (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, esp. chaps. 3 and 10). Such imperial projects of deculturation that the Comaroffs describe for South Africa in the late nineteenth century were remarkable neither for their scale nor for their innovation, however. Changing notions of person and body have been were integral to the creation of Christian disciples and colonial subjects in the Amerindian highlands of Latin America since the mid-sixteenth century. Indeed, the Andean region provided one of the original theaters of European imperial biopower, as the Spanish state and missionaries began to hammer out policies of cultural and bodily reform (Silverblatt 2004). In the 1570s and 1580s, Viceroy Francisco Toledo engineered successive “civilizing” campaigns to eradicate polygamy and other “barbarous” customs, nucleate indigenous settlements, restructure ethnic hierarchies, impose legal and moral norms, extract tribute and labor from every “strategic hamlet” in the viceroyalty, and convert the heathen and extirpate the idolaters. Missions and schools were established to spearhead that cultural revolution. That Toledo’s project largely failed in
many of its overarching goals is testimony to the vast historic distance obtaining between imperial utopias and local forms of autonomy and adaptive resistance throughout the Andean highlands over three centuries of Spanish rule.

In the early twentieth century, Latin America’s aspiring nation-states took up the unfinished project of molding Indian minds and bodies into a homogeneous mass of docile national, class, and gendered subjects. Blunt material conditions (export-driven capitalism, liberal ideologies and land reform policies, growing agrarian violence surrounding the practice of land divestiture and peasant resistance, massive rural-to-urban migration, a sprawling urban underclass and its attendant social ills) demanded new modes of population management and cultural reform. Among other reforms, the education of the masses suddenly loomed large. In the Bolivian Andes, where bio-cultural “whitening” vis-à-vis European immigration was proving to be unviable, political elites seized on the idea of Indian education as both a powerful symbol and potential tool of indigenous incorporation into the modern Bolivian nation. By 1910, educators and intellectuals were embracing the nationalist ideal (popular in Argentina, Chile, and other Latin American nations) of “national pedagogy,” designed to shape national subjects in harmony with Bolivia’s environmental, racial, and social specificities.

Unpacked and examined critically, this notion of “national pedagogy” is fraught with contradictions. While the idea of national pedagogy embraced Enlightenment principles of universal schooling and citizenship, it also invoked race and environmental theories to define the bio-cultural character of the Indian race(s) and, on that basis, to limit indigenous access to schooling and knowledge (even were they able to attend a functioning rural school in the first place). Concretely, indigenista racial theorists advocated a segregated system tailored to the “innate character” of the Indian. Translated into policy, separate “work” schools were to prepare Indians for their selected and limited entry into the national economy and polity as rural wage laborers on the otherwise uncolonizable altiplano. Vocational training had another significance: it pushed literacy to the edge of the curriculum in the rural Indian school, since to read and write was deemed a useless, if not dangerous, source of knowledge among a feisty, often litigious peasantry.

We have here, then, a tangible locus of what Andrew Canessa has called “the [state’s] opposing and frequently contradictory tendency of seeing Indians as being on the periphery and requiring assimilation and simultaneously as being at the heart of national [economy], culture, and
identity” (see the introduction). Throughout the early twentieth century, Bolivian reformers and indigenistas were caught on the horns of the post-colonial dilemma—the need to construct and mediate racial difference (to contain agrarian unrest, preserve creole caste privileges, and control the geopolitical and racial mobility of Indian peasants) and the need to eradicate it in the service of a homogenizing national culture. It is a common irony among modernizing Latin American nations that, to the degree that states did manage to tame their interior “Indian” frontiers, they tended to uplift those vanishing cultures and lost civilizations to iconic status and include them in their emerging repertory of civil celebrations. Such was the fate, of course, of Argentina’s gauchos, Peru’s Incas, and to a far lesser degree, Bolivia’s ancient Aymara outpost of Tiwanaku. In Bolivia, thanks to the robust presence (and perceived threat) of indigenous peoples, political elites only belatedly and ambivalently embraced indigeneity as the mark of authentic Bolivianess (although see the interesting case of creole women appropriating Aymara music as “authentic Bolivia” in chapter 2 of this volume). Indeed, Bolivia’s most common strand of indigenismo took a conservative, reactive stance against the putative ills of modernity (Indian migration into the cities, vice and criminality, spread of popular literacy, suffrage, and other forms of “political mischief”). Much like Cuzco’s romantic indigenistas of the 1920s, Bolivian elites wanted to deploy racial discourse and school policy to reproduce and upgrade the “unique aptitudes” of the Aymara labor force on the altiplano. In the 1920s, gender supplied a complementary prop to naturalize racial and subracial categories.

But, as we have seen in this chapter, there was nothing natural or fixed about elite notions or calibrations of gender, race, class, and nation. In different historical moments, the social meanings and uses of those categories rearticulated and changed with the times, especially under the impact of revolution (as in Mexico during the 1910s) or war (as in Bolivia in the 1930s). In both cases, the imperatives of reconstructing state power and bringing Indians into the fold forced a radical reconfiguration of race, gender, and national identities. In the case of Bolivia, we perceive an unfolding national narrative in which gender began to trump race as the main modality by which political elites began to redefine the boundaries of difference and sameness. Such discursive and normative shifts were deeply grounded in the dangerous disjunctions that accompanied the Chaco War and its aftermath. During the war, issues of gender, physicality, and psychology became subjects of national debate, as the Bolivian
state contemplated the need to mobilize, discipline, and dispatch tens of thousands of Indian male bodies to the front lines in the Chaco War. In the immediate post-Chaco era, national unity and popular redemption called for radical experiments in communitarian schools and multiethnic coalitions. Bolivia’s devastating military defeat also called for a massive effort to integrate the Indian masses into the nation, if it were ever to be able to integrate the masses and defend its borders. In the meantime, the state confronted a new set of self-defined subjects (veterans, widows, mothers, and orphans), who militantly demanded public recognition and reparations for their own horrific sacrifices in the Chaco War. Gender and generation, as well as patriotic sacrifice and honor, now began to permeate both official and popular notions of national belonging.

But the ideological uses of gender, race, and nation took on new dimensions in the 1940s. The specter of indigenous mobilization, mining strikes, and the spread of “worldwide communism” in the mid-1940s jolted Bolivian conservative reformers and their new U.S. allies. Transracial notions of gender now became tools for promoting de-indianization, mestizaje, and cultural integration. In particular, nationalizing womanhood as the womb, nurturer, healer, and heroine of the war-torn nation became a critical trope in the 1940s. At the same time, Bolivia engendered rural school curricula in order to hasten the cult of domesticity and its particular order of values and dispositions. Now the Indian woman was to be anchored in her own “natural habitat”—the peasant hearth and home. In many ways, the new curricular emphasis on bodily reform and family values sprang from the nation’s urgent developmental needs to cultivate new habits of hygiene, work, and consumption. But, as I have tried to show, the impulse toward what the Comaroffs call “home-made hegemony” also came out of the intense struggle over power in this radically polarized, hierarchical society. Ironically, the Bolivian reformers’ search for a Mexican-styled paradigm of mestizaje and rural development was aimed at building a hegemonic social order that would skip over, and preempt, a radical social uprising on the scale of Mexico’s 1910 revolution. The state’s failed effort to deploy Indian education to integrate the peasant masses and preempt revolution represents, in my view, an exquisite episode in historical irony. But it is not the outcome, so much as the process, that interests us here. For it shows how, in the struggle to define Indian education, a nation’s cultural engineers wrestled with recursive notions of gender, race, and class to keep its rural indigenous people at the margins of the nation and modernity.
Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this chapter was published in Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, edited by Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo (London and Cambridge, Mass.: University of London and Harvard University, 2003), 183–209. It is reprinted here with permission from the publishers.

Bibliography

Barnadas, Josep. 1976. Apuntes para una Historia Aymara. La Paz: CIPCA.
———. 1928. Redactor de la Honorable Cámara de Diputados. La Paz: Brazil.
Frontaura Argona, María. 1932. Hacia el futuro indio. La Paz: Intendencia de Guerra.
Gotkowitz, Laura. 2000. "Commemorating the Heroínas: Gender and Civic Ritual in Early Twentieth Century Bolivia." In Hidden Histories of Gender and the...

Guillén Pinto, Alfredo. 1919. La educación del indio: Contribución a la pedagogía nacional. La Paz: González y Medina.


Mariaca, Juvenal, and Arturo Peñaranda. 1918. Proyecto de organización de una escuela normal agrícola de indígenas en el altiplano. La Paz: Boliviana.


———. 1919. Memoria y anexo. La Paz: Moderna.


Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia, ed. 1996. Ser mujer indígena, chola o birlocha en la Bolivia postcolonial de los años 90. La Paz: Plural.


United States Record Administration. 1945. Record Group 39, 824, 401/3–145; Adam to Secretary of State, March 1.

